STATE OF GUJARAT Vs. THAKORLAL KESHAVLAL RANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Who does not know that the practice of "plea bargaining" under clever camouflage of "plead guily" is nothing but an outrageous affront to the sense and cause of justice ? In fact, it is matter of record that somewhere in the year 1973, on coming to the knowledge of this Court that in large number of food adulteration cases, the accused on pleading guilty, were let off with ridiculously low sentences till rising of the Court and some nominal fine, that the then learned Chief Justice was constrained to issue suo motu notices to all concerned accused calling upon them to show cause as to why their sentences should not be enhanced. Thereafter also the said condemened unfortunate practice quite surprisingly and shockingly persists in complete defiance of the provisions of the statute itself and observations made by the higher Courts in their reported judgments. Rather experience whispers in ears that such "plea bargaining" practies have become recurring feature particularly in certain types of Criminal Cases where the same is okayed without any sense of judicial restraint and accountability by some Courts taking it as if that beyond the statutory appellate or revisional jurisdiction of the High Court namely either of quashing and setting aside or modifying the impugned order of sentence, the same had no power to control such disgraceful state of affairs. Indeed it is this challenging posture of "plea bargaining" which impinges upon the conscience of this Court to make some indepth plain speaking about the same with a view to see that the judicial system at level of the trial Court is spared and freed from the said chronic disease of the "plea bargaining", if that can be done. The heart-burn reflections made hereinabove is also the subject-matter of the appeal at hand, which raises three important questions viz. (i) whether the trial Court has any jurisdiction to award ligher sentence once it is found that the statute has fixed the inflexible minimum sentence for particular offences ? (ii) whether the order of "sentenced till rising of the Court" and some fine etc. in response to the accused pleading guilty and praying for mercy more especially in cases where the statute has prescribed the minimum sentence per se amounts to "plea-bargaining" ? and (iii) further what indeed ought to be the duty of the trial Court in cases where the accused who is alleged to have committed an offence for which the statute has prescribed the minimum sentence and he at once pleads guilty and prays for mercy - both rolled up in common plea ? 1.1 Before this Court undertakes discussion to answer the questions raised hereinabove, let us first of all appreciate the facts, circumstances and law governing the case leading upto the filing of this appeal for enhancement of the sentence.

(2.) To start with this appeal for enhancement of sentence is directed against the judgment and order dated 26/07/1983, rendered in Criminal Case No. 793 of 1983 passed by the learned J.M.F.C. Savli, wherein two respondent-accused viz. (i) Thakorlal Keshavlal Rana and (ii) Mafatalal Keshavlal Rana both of whom on pleading guilty to the charge under Sec. 7 read with Sec. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short the said Act), came to be convicted for the same and each of them were sentenced till rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 100.00and Rs. 600/- and in default to undergo further S.I. for 15 days and one month respectively.

(3.) Briefly speaking on 27/05/1983, the Food Inspector Mr. K. A. Patel visited "Shital Cold-drink House" belonging to the respondent-accused at Savli and in presence of the Panchas took sample of the ice-cream for analysis. The said sample was thereafter forwarded to the public analyst. Baroda, which on being analysed, was found to be not conforming to the standard and provisions laid under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. On the basis of these facts, after obtaining the necessary sanction, the Food Inspector filed a complaint dated 8/05/1983 before the trial Court against the respondent-accused for the alleged offences under Secs. 7 and 16 of the said Act.