VAN AND COMPANY Vs. BABUBHAI LALLUBHAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition has been filed by the employer against the order made by the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, and the order made by the Appellate Authority in appeal. Respondents Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 were the workmen employed by the petitioner company. The claims made by these six workmen were separate and independent clams. It appears that they were disposed of by one order by the Controlling Authority. The appeals filed against those orders were dismissed on the ground that they were barred by time. Since these workmen had made independent claims, it was necessary for the petitioner to file six petitions in this Court. Merely because the Controlling Authority and the Appellate Authority each made a common order, the petitioner cannot file a single petition against it. However, we do not propose to throw off this petition on that ground.

(2.) The first contention, which Mr. Dave has raised on behalf of the employer, is that the Appellate Authority was in error in dismissing the appeals on the ground that they were barred by time. It is not in dispute before us that the appeals were preferred after the expiry of 120 days from the date of the order. Sub-Sec. (7) Sec. 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, provides as follows: Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf. Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days. Sub-sec. (7) of Sec. 7 makes it clear beyond any doubt that if an appeal has been preferred beyond a period of sixty days, the Appellate Authority has jurisdiction to extend time for a further period of 60 days. In other words, after the expiry of 120 days from the date of the order of the Controlling Authority, the Appellate Authority has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal Ex. facie, therefore, the appeal preferred before the Appellate Authority was time-barred. The Appellate Authority was, therefore, justified in dismissing it in limine.

(3.) Mr. Dave has, however, invited our attention to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides as follows: Whether any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions contained in section 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. So far as the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 is concerned, it does not, prescribe any period of limitation for preferring the present kind of appeals. However, it is well settled that sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29 applies to cases where the Schedule does not prescribe period of limitation for a particular kind of appeal.