BAI DAMYANTI Vs. PUSPABEN GUNVANTRAI RAVAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision application raises a vexed question as to the crucial date viz. the date of the order within the meaning of the second proviso to sec. 145(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code with reference to which the inquiry as to possession has to be made when the applicant was not in actual possession and had been forcibly dispossessed. The section in terms states the crucial date as the date of the preliminary order passed under section 145(1) and that the fact of actual possession has to be inquired with reference to that date or if a person had been dispossessed within two months next before this date he is to be treated as if in actual possession on that date. It is however contended that this section would have to be liberally construed and this two months period which is allowed by the Legislature for doing justice to a man dispossessed must be extended by relating back the preliminary order to the date when the petition is filed or when the Magistrate takes cognizance either from the police report or any other information in those cases where the Magistrate himself is responsible for the delay. In the present case on the death of the father-in-law on May 25 1969 there has been a dispute between these two brothers families. The applicant is one brothers wife while the respondent No. 1 is the other brothers wife and the other two opponents were the other brothers children. The applicant had alleged that she had been forcibly dispossessed by opponents on July 16 1969 on the next day i.e. July 17 1969 the N. C. complaint was filed. The present application was filed only on September 11 1969 on the ground that the police had told the applicant that this being the brothers dispute must be amicably settled rather than having recourse to the criminal Court. on this petition the learned Chief City Magistrate passed an unusual order even when the two months period from the date of the alleged dispossession was going to expire only within the few days. The learned Chief City Magistrate on the very same day on presentation of this petition issued a notice to the other side and fixed the matter for hearing before passing the preliminary order. Consequently the two months period from the alleged dispossession on July 16 1969 expired even before the preliminary order in the present case was passed on December 18 1969 Thereafter by the final order dated February 22 1970 the preliminary order has been cancelled on the ground that no dispute as required under sec. 145(1) existed and because the question of factum of possession on July 16 1969 could not be decided as that date was beyond the two months limit envisaged by the second proviso in sec. 145(4) from the crucial date of the preliminary order. The applicant had therefore filed the present revision application which in view of the conflict of authorities on this vexed question has been referred to us by the learned Single Judge.

(2.) The material clauses of sec. 145 in this connection which are to be considered are sub-clauses (1) (4) (5) and (6) as under:-

(3.) As Lord Evershed pointed out in Rookes v. Barnard 1964 A.C. 1129 at page 1193 it is the universal rule as Lord Wensleydate observed in Grey v. Pearson (1857) 6 H.L.C. 61 106 H.L. that in construing statutes as in construing all other written instruments the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency but no further. If the words of the statute arc in themselves precise and unambiguous then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do in such case best declare the intention of the law giver. His Lordship further pointed out that nowadays when it is a rare thing to find a preamble in any public general statute the field of inquiry is even narrower than it was in former times. In the absence of a preamble there can be only two cases in which it is permissible to depart from the ordinary and natural sense of the words of an enactment. It must be shown either that the words taken in their natural sense lead to some absurdity or that there is some other clause in the body of the Act inconsistent with or repugnant to the enactment in question construed in the ordinary sense of the language in which it is expressed. Therefore it is the settled principle of interpretation that if the language of the statute is precise and unambiguous nothing more can be done by Courts than expound those words in their natural ordinary sense. It is only if the enactment in question when construed in the ordinary natural sense of the language in which it is expressed leads to absurdity inconsistency or repugnancy that it would be permissible for the Court to depart from the ordinary natural sense of the words of the enactment. In the present case the expression 4date of the preliminary order can hardly be made more precise and clear. There is no absurdity or doubt in this clear expression used by the Legislature which has no ambiguity. When this term is not capable of two meanings or two constructions no question can arise for giving liberal or wider construction so as to avoid any ambiguity repugnancy inconsistency etc. If the power of the Court to construe a statute even by filling up the gaps is only interstitial it is obvious that it can be exercised in those case where the statutory language in the ordinary natural sense is capable of two interpretations. If however the statutory enactment is expressed in clear unambiguous language as in the present case even if there is casus omissus it has to be left to the Legislature to intervene to meet such hard cases but it is not open to the Court to rewrite the statute by attempting to fill up the casus omissus. In fact it would be against all settled principles of construction to proceed on the assumption that the Legislature has committed a mistake.