LAWS(GJH)-2020-6-363

SAGARSING Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT

Decided On June 10, 2020
Sagarsing Appellant
V/S
STATE OF GUJARAT Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) On consideration of the rival submissions, the petition is required to be allowed on the following grounds:

(2.) Though the petitioner has been nomenclated as dangerous person, there is nothing on record to show as to how the public order was disturbed by the activities of the petitioner. The Supreme Court in Pushker Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal [AIR 1970 SC 852] has pointed out the distinction between the "public order" and "law and order". While the case as to disturbance of public order would be made out when the conduct of a person nomenclated as dangerous person is such as would create a terror like atmosphere in the society; by very nature of his conduct there would be a constant fear in the society. The general impression would be created by his conduct that a person possesses a dangerous character. The law and order situation is quite different than the public order. In contrast, where the nucleus of the dispute lie in personal grievance/quarrel not affecting or terrorizing the society at large, the dispute can be dealt with under the ordinary law and the drastic action under the detention law would not be warranted.

(3.) In all two criminal cases are cited against the petitioner to call him as dangerous person; both the cases reveal that the dispute was of a personal character inasmuch as, in one of the cases the petitioner allegedly acted illegally attacking Ajay to discourage him maintaining the affectionate relation with the relative of the detenu. In another case also the complaint is made under Sections 294 , 323 and 506 of IPC. The case does not reveal any attribute infecting the social core. The witnesses which are cited are all pertaining to the said two cases. There is nothing on record indicating the material or the statements of the witnesses characterizing the petitioner as unruly, high-handed head strong person causing danger to the society as a whole in general. Thus, in the opinion of this court, none of the statements or none of the cases would justify the detention under PASA.