SHREYAS PRATISHTHAN Vs. RASHMIBEN C TRIVEDI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed to quash and set aside the order passed by the Appellate Authority under The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (for short, "the Act") in Appeal No.4/1992 dated 31.07.1993, whereby, the said Appeal was dismissed and the order passed by the Controlling Authority under the said Act in Case No.1459/1989 dated 11.12.1991 directing the petitioner to pay an amount of Rs.5,075.40 to respondent no.1 was confirmed.

(2.) The facts in brief are that respondent no.1 herein was appointed in the Children Department of the Pre-primary School of the petitioner vide order dated 13.06.1978. It is the case of the petitioner that respondent no.1 was discharging the duties of a Teacher pursuant to her appointment. With effect from 10.08.1989 respondent no.1 resigned from the School run by the petitioner. In pursuance thereof, she filed Case No.1459/1989 against the petitioner before the Controlling Authority under the said Act for payment of Gratuity. The said application came to be disposed of vide order dated 11.12.1991, whereby, the petitioner was directed to pay an amount of Rs.5,076.40 towards Gratuity to respondent no.1. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed Appeal No.4/1992 before the Appellate Authority under the said Act. However, the said Appeal came to be dismissed vide order dated 31.07.1993. Hence, this petition.

(3.) Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the documents on record. The appointment of respondent no.1 in the Pre-primary School of the petitioner was not as a Teacher but, as a supporting staff. The nature of duties performed by respondent no.1 was that of a clerk. In fact, in some other proceedings before the Tribunal, the petitioner had taken the stand that persons employed in the Children Department of the School cannot be termed as 'Teachers'. Therefore, it is not open to the petitioner to take two different stands on a single issue. Even otherwise, there is nothing on record to show that respondent no.1 was appointed in the capacity of a Teacher. Looking to the facts of the case and the evidence on record, I am of the opinion that both the authorities below are completely justified in passing the impugned orders. Hence, I find no reasons to interfere in this petition.