KRUPABEN B TRIVEDI Vs. GOVERNMENT OF GUJARAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard the learned Advocates. By order dated 12th May, 1997, made by the Government of Gujarat, the petitioner herein was appointed to be the Tribunal under the Gujarat Affiliated Colleges Services Tribunal Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The terms and conditions of her appointment as Tribunal under the Act were determined under the Resolution dated 29th December, 1997 (Annexure-G to the petition). The term relevant for the purposes of this petition was the condition No. 3, which stipulated that the said appointment shall be operative till the Tribunal attains the age of 58 years. However, on 16th April, 1999, the Government issued a notice to the petitioner informing her that Rule 2 of the Gujarat Affiliated Colleges Services Tribunal (Terms and Conditions of Service of a person constituting the Tribunal) Rules, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1982') provides that the person constituting the Tribunal shall hold office for a period of two years on and with effect from which he takes over the charge of the office. The condition No. 3 of the appointment of the petitioner stipulated in the Resolution dated 29th December, 1997, was contrary to the aforesaid statutory provision. The terms and conditions of the appointment of the petitioner were, therefore, required to be modified to bring them in consonance with the said Rule. The petitioner was called upon to show cause against the proposed action. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner preferred Special Civil Application No. 3569 of 1999 before this Court, under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The learned single Judge (Coram : Mr. Justice S. K. Keshote) on llth May, 1999, held that the said petition was premature and dismissed the same. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 1393 of 1999. Pending the said Letters Patent Appeal, by order dated 13th April, 2000, the petitioner's service was terminated. In view of the order dated 13th April, 2000, the Letters Patent Appeal has been disposed of (?). Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 13th April, 2000, the petitioner has preferred the present petition.

(2.) . It is not disputed that pursuant to the impugned order, the petitioner's service has been terminated and by Notification dated 13th April, 2000, the respondent No. 2 has been appointed to be the Tribunal. It is also not disputed that in view of the interim order made by this Court and the status quo ordered to be maintained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 8403 of 2000, the respondent No. 2 is prevented from functioning as the Tribunal. Hence, at present, neither the petitioner nor the respondent No. 2 has been functioning' as the Tribunal.

(3.) . Mr. Vakil has submitted that Rule 2 of the Rules of 1982 is ultra vires the Act and also the Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution and is, therefore, void. In the alternative, he has submitted that Rule 2 of the Rules of 1982 requires to be read down to mean that it shall apply only in case where a District Judge or a person who has been the High Court Judge has been appointed to be the Tribunal under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Act, and the same shall not apply to a person appointed to be the Tribunal who is qualified to be a Judge of a High Court or a District Court, and who is neither a District Judge nor has been a High Court Judge as stipulated in the said sub-section. He next contended that the impugned order dated 13th April, 2000, is inconsistent with Rule 2 of the Rules of 1982 and is, therefore, vitiated. Besides, the appointing authority (the State Government) did not afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Moreover, by the impugned order, neither the terms of the appointment of the petitioner are modified, nor the same are set aside. Further, the impugned order is not a speaking order. The impugned order, therefore, is violative of principles of natural justice. He has strenuously urged that the impugned order has been made while the Letters Patent Appeal No. 1393 of 1999 preferred by the petitioner was pending and has been made with a view to over-reaching the process of the Court. The order is, therefore, vitiated on mala fide also. In support of these contentions, Mr. Vakil has relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the matters of S. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 386; Ajit Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 494; K. Nagraj and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. AIR 1985 SC 551; Laghu Udyog Bharti and Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1999 SC 2596 : 1999 (6) SCC 418; Dr. Pradip Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1420; Premchand Somchand Shah and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr., 1991 (2) SCC 48; Ashok Kumar Gupta and Anr. v. State of U. P. and Ors.. 1997 (5) SCC 201; Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner and Anr., AIR 1978 SC 851; Kishan Lal v. Union of India and Anr.. 1998 (2) SCC 392; Bhupatlal Govindji v. Bhanumati Dayalal, 1983 (2) GLR 1137 : AIR 1984 Guj. 10; Smt. Indravati Devi v. Bulu Ghosh & Anr., AIR 1990 Patna 1; Mohamad Jafar v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 1 and State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners' Association & Ors., JT 1998 (1) SC 604 : 1998 (2) GLR 1079 (SC).