DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT OFFICER Vs. MANIBEN VIRABHAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this reference by the learned Single Judge to the Full Bench of this Court, the question involved is of correct interpretation of clause (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is substituted by the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978.

(2.) In the course of deciding Civil Application No. 1724 of 1995 in the present Special Civil Application No. 642 of 1994, the learned Single Judge M.R. Calla, J noticed that interpretation placed on clause (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the learned Single Judge H.L. Gokhale, J (as he then was) in the decision reported in (Mrs.) S.N. Pandor and Others vs. District Judge, District Court, Sabarkantha 1995(2) GLH 976 requires consideration by a larger Bench of this Court.

(3.) Clause (3) of Article 226 introduced by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978, as the text of the said clause shows, obviously was with an intention that ex-parte interim orders by way of injunction or stay in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution passed against the party by the High Court should not operate to the prejudice of that party for an indefinite period of time. Clause (3) of Article 226 therefore requires that an interim order by way of injunction or stay obtained without furnishing to the party against whom the order is made, copy of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order and giving such party an opportunity of being heard, shall automatically stand vacated if the aggrieved party makes an application to the High Court for vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party and on completion of such formalities the High Court fails to dispose of the application for vacating the interim order within a period of two weeks from the date on which the application for vacating interim order is received, or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished to the opposite party, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period before the expiry of the next date afterwards the High Court is opened.