GANGADHARAN APPLIANCES Vs. CCE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE dispute in this case relates to classification of bakelite handles for use in pressure cookers. The lower authorities classified them under SH 3924.90 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act and demanded differential duty from the assessee. According to the party, the goods are classifiable as parts of pressure cookers under SH 7323.10 or SH 7615.20 depending on the material used. They had paid duty on the goods accordingly. In the present appeals, they challenge the classification done by the lower authorities. However, there is no representation for them today despite notice, nor any request of theirs for adjournment. It is submitted by learned SDR that the issue is already covered in favour of the Revenue by the decision of the Tribunal in the cases of Collector v. Amrapali Industries and Collector v. Dalal Plastic Corporation .

(2.) AFTER considering the grounds of these appeals and the submissions of learned SDR, we find that classification of bakelite handles for use in pressure cookers has already been held under Heading 39.22 of the CETA Schedule in the case of Amrapali Industries (supra). In the case of Dalal Industries Corporation (supra), it was held that Headings 73.21 and 76.15 were applicable to products of iron or steel and aluminium respectively and not to products of plastic which were classifiable under Chapter 39. Following the cited case law, we affirm classification of the subject goods under SH 3924.90. We have noticed that the above case law was relied on by the lower appellate authority, but the same have not been claimed by the appellants to be inapplicable, nor to be distinguishable.

(3.) THE appellants have also challenged quantification of the duty on the ground that the benefit of Section 4(4)(d)(ii) of the Central Excise Act was not granted to them. This grievance appears to be genuine. If the lower authorities have not allowed abatement, from sale price of the goods, of the element of duty for the purpose of determining assessable value of the goods, they have got to grant such relief to the appellants. For this limited purpose, we remand the matter to the original authority for requantification of the differential duty to be paid by the appellants in terms of the above classification of the goods. It is made clear that, on this question, a reasonable opportunity of being heard shall be given to the assessee.