LAWS(CE)-2011-12-143

SHIV NARAYAN BANSAL Vs. COMMISSIONER OF C. EX.

Decided On December 23, 2011
Shiv Narayan Bansal Appellant
V/S
COMMISSIONER OF C. EX. Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) LEARNED Counsel Shri Asthana submits that activity of carrying out job work was considered by Revenue as "manpower supply".

(2.) Such a misconception can be over -ruled by reading of the agreement at page 48 of the appeal folder which explains terms of agreement between the parties made on 2 -3 -2004. The agreement categorically show that appellant was to carry out the activity enumerated in Clause 3 thereof following the sequence mentioned therein and supported by the act carried out. By a proper construction of agreement one can infer that manufacturing activity carried out by the appellant is beyond the scope of Service Tax law to tax such activity. There was no 'manpower supply' when manufacturing was intended object of the agreement. Discharge of the contractual obligation under clause III of the agreement making manufacture of the fabric sack was agreed between parties. Therefore, the appellant shall not be liable to Service Tax as manpower provider. Hence, stay applications as well as appeal may be disposed of for no reason to keep that pending when terms of contract is clear. Learned DR vehemently objects to the above proposal. He submits that while object of the agreement at page 48 was to provide skilled labour for carrying out the activity and statutory liability under labour law was of the appellant in terms of the Clause 8, the appellant had employed labour and such act comes within the purview of manpower supply. Heard both sides and perused the records. We have gone through the finding of adjudicating authority and also the observations of the authorities at page 63 of the appeal folder, wherein the authorities had noted that: -

(3.) ON totality of the construction of the agreement at page 48 of the appeal folder without being read in piece -meal does not throw light to hold that the objective of the parties was to provide manpower only without carrying out manufacture. Had that been the objective, the appellant would have ceased to operate after supply of manpower. But that was not so. While object is clear from Clause 3 of agreement, that appears to be determining factor to decide incidence of tax under law.