DAYA NAND SHARMA Vs. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN support of the writ petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that he has no grievance except that he would like us to apply the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of Tripura and others vs. Naresh Chandra Das, reported in (2007) 15 SCC 759. In that case, a police constable was removed from service. A suit was filed, which was dismissed. The First Appeal, too, was dismissed and, in the Second Appeal, a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Assam, Agartala Bench, allowed the appeal holding that dismissal for mere absence is too harsh a punishment. The learned Single Judge directed reinstatement with 25 per cent of the back wages, preserving the liberty of the disciplinary authority to impose any punishment. This judgment was not interfered with by the Honble Supreme Court. It granted leave, then observed that, even though there is some force in the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Honble Supreme Court is not inclined to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution. It, ultimately, concluded the matter by interfering with only that part of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, which directed payment of 25 per cent back wages. This judgment of the Honble Supreme Court does not lay down any principle of law binding on the courts. We have not been able to gather anything from this judgment, which makes it mandatory on the part of the courts, as is the mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution, to follow while rendering judgments.

(2.) IN our case, petitioner remained absent from 3rd September, 1996 until the date of service of the charge -sheet, which was effected on 22nd June, 1998. The learned counsel submitted that he has no grievance as regards the procedure that was followed by the disciplinary authority; thereafter, by the appellate authority; and, ultimately, by the revisional authority. The learned counsel has also no grievance insofar as the manner, in which the Tribunal dealt with the matter, is concerned. His contention is this that mere absence from duty is not sufficient ground for passing an order of dismissal. The fact remains that no reply to the charge -sheet was given. Even in the writ petition or in the previous pleadings, petitioner did not disclose what prevented him from not discharging his duties for 980 days. At the time when the writ petition was considered by us initially, we requested the Government to consider whether it would be possible to convert the order of dismissal into an order of compulsory retirement. The learned Standing Counsel submitted that the State Government has not been able to take such a decision fearing that the same will create a precedent in the disciplined forces, upon which the Government is dependent for maintenance of law and order. We find a person serving a disciplined force vanishing himself for two years without even bothering to let his superiors know the reason for his disappearance, does not deserve any sympathy.

(3.) WE , accordingly, dismiss the writ petition.