KRIPAL SINGH Vs. DEPUTY LABOUR COMMISSIONER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD Mr. Z.U. Siddiqui, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ajay Singh Bisht, the learned counsel for the respondent No.3.

(2.) THE petitioner has prayed for the quashing of the orders dated 30th March, 1996 and the order dated 29th August, 1995. THE facts leading to the filing of the writ petition is, that the respondent-workman filed a claim for delayed wages under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. On 28th March, 1995, the petitioner was present when the case was called out and the claimant/opp. party was not present. THE Presiding Officer, accordingly, after recording the presence of the employer-petitioner and the absence of the workman, dismissed the case for want of prosecution. But before the order could be signed by the Presiding Officer, the ordersheet indicates that subsequently the workman appeared and, accordingly, the Presiding Officer directed that the matter would be listed on the next day, i.e. 29th March, 1995 for the evidence of the workman.

(3.) THESE facts as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner apparently is not borne out from the record. The record indicates that the case was dismissed for want of prosecution. But before the ordersheet could be signed by the Presiding Officer, the workman appeared and, accordingly, the next day was fixed for evidence of the workman, namely, 29th March, 1995. A photocopy of the ordersheet has been filed as an annexure to the writ petition which indicates that after the entire order was passed, the Presiding Officer has signed and the endorsement of the petitioner as well as of the workman is indicated on the margin of the ordersheet. If the petitioner had signed the ordersheet before the Presiding Officer had signed the order and before the last three lines of the order was transcribed, it should have been specifically stated with precision in the recall application. This fact is missing and has not been stated for reasons best known to the petitioner. Consequently, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that he had left the premises after the dismissal of the case and was not aware that the order was subsequently recalled and the case was fixed for next day cannot be believed.