(1.) The question that is referred for consideration of the Full Bench is whether the period of 90 days made mention of in R.44 of the Rules of the High Court of Kerala, 1971, hereinafter referred for short as the Rules, can be treated as prescription of period of limitation in the matter of filing of revision petitions under S.20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, hereinafter referred for short as the Act and whether a separate petition to condone the delay under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is required, if the revision petition is filed beyond the period of 90 days.
(2.) S.20 of the Act which deals with the revisional jurisdiction provides that in cases where the appellate authority empowered under S.18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken the Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. The Government by notification dated 31.8.1989 conferred on the District Judges the power of the appellate authorities under the Act. Consequently the power of revision under S.20 is now vested in the High Court. Under S.18 of the Act a period of 30 days has been fixed for filing an appeal before the appellate authority by a person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Control Court. But admittedly there is no provision either under the Act nor under the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Rules, 1979 prescribing any period of limitation for filing a revision under S.20 of the Act. As early as in 1969 Krishna Iyer, J. had occasion to consider the effect of this lacuna in Piadmanabha Pillai v. Narayana Pillai, 1969 KLJ 614 , and the learned Judge observed as follows:-
(3.) Before we go into the question whether the Rules would satisfy the requirement of a special law prescribing period of limitation, we will refer to the earlier decisions of this Court which had considered the question regarding the period of limitation for filing a revision under S.20 of the Act. In Narayanan v. Rent Controller, 1988 (2) KLT 74 , a Single Bench of this Court took the view that the exercise of revisional power under S.20 is entirely discretionary in the interests of justice. It does not confer any right on the petitioner but only vest a power in the Court. It is a privilege conferred on the petitioner and not a right. Even though there is no period of limitation prescribed for filing the revision, the petitioner is expected to be diligent in invoking the revisional power. He must come to Court without undue delay, at the earliest. The words at any time in S.20 have to be delimited to reasonable levels having regard to prevalent practice and the nature of the power to be exercised. The learned Judge proceeded to hold that a period of 90 days should be treated as a reasonable time, within which an aggrieved party should move under S.20 of the Act. Any delay, thereafter, has to be explained satisfactorily before the Court can be requested to exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner. It was pointed out by the learned Judge that under the Limitation Act, 1908 there was no period of limitation prescribed for revision petition under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Nevertheless it had been the accepted rule of practice and discretion in almost all High Courts that the party aggrieved must approach the High Court for the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under S.115 within a period of 90 days. Any application beyond the above conventional period was treated as belated. Later, the Limitation Act, 1963 gave legislative recognition to this conventional period in Art.131 of the Schedule to the Act. The learned Judge also made reference to the practice of the Court to insist that normally a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution has also to be filed within a period of 90 days.