FAROOK SHAFI Vs. STATE OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) An interesting question is raised in this Writ Appeal filed by a member of the Kerala Judicial Service. Question is from what date an officer is deemed to be in service, ie., whether from the date of his order of appointment or the date he assumes charge.

(2.) Factual position is undisputed. By order dated 22.3.1983, Government of Kerala appointed appellant and five others as District and Sessions Judges. Pursuant to that, this Court issued an order on 30.6.1983 posting him as Additional District Judge, Thrissur. He took charge on 25.7.1983. Pay scales of District and Sessions Judges were revised as per G.O.(P) 515/85/Fin. dated 16.9.1985. Pay revision was given retrospective effect from 1.7.1983. In the order revising scales of pay, it was stipulated that an incumbent in the post could exercise an option to remain in the pre-existing pay scale until a future date to be chosen to him. It was further stipulated that an employee whose scale of pay immediately prior to 1st July 1983 is revised, will be allowed to exercise option to remain in the existing scale until such date as considered necessary. Six months time was given to the employees to exercise such option. Appellant exercised option to continue in the scale of pay of District Judges mat existed prior to 1.7.1983 for a future period and then to come to the revised scale of pay which came into force with effect from 1-7-1983. This claim of appellant was turned down by respondents on the ground that he was not a District Judge on 1.7.1983. Refusal was challenged in OP 4847 of 1989. Learned Single Judge rejected the petition holding that since appellant was appointed as District and Sessions Judge after 1.7.1983 and on such appointment he came into the revised scale of pay which came into force with effect from 1.7.1983, his claim to continue in the pre-existing scale was misconceived.

(3.) In support of the appeal, it is stated that appellant was appointed on 22.3.1983. The fact that he took charge as Additional District Judge only on 25.7.1983 cannot take away the effect of his appointment. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, submitted that until appellant took charge, it cannot be said that he was a District Judge. Stand of appellant was that he was entitled to salary from the date he took charge and for all practical purposes, he was a District Judge from the date of his appointment.