PRABHAKARAN Vs. DISTRICT EXECUTIVE OFFICER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard Mr. T. M. Sunil for the appellant and Mr. Alexander Thomas, Government Pleader for respondent No. 2.

(2.) This Writ Appeal was filed against the Judgment of C. S. Rajan, J. in O.P. 10910/96 dated 1st February 1999. The said Original Petition was filed by the appellant to quash Exts. P-4 to P-11 and to declare that the District Executive Officer, Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Board, Palakkad has no jurisdiction to pass Exts. P-4 to P-11 orders. The Original Petition was heard and dismissed by the learned Single Judge by directing the appellant to avail himself of the remedy of filing an appeal before the Government under the Kerala Motor Transport Welfare Fund Act along with a petition to condone the delay if any in filing the appeal on account of the pendency of the Original Petition in this court. Learned Judge has also directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs. 7,500/- on or before 28th February 1999. Being aggrieved against the Judgment the above Appeal has been preferred. Since no counter affidavit was filed in the Original Petition, we directed the respondent to file a counter affidavit. Accordingly the Chief Executive Officer of the Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund has filed a counter affidavit along with Ext. R-1(a) which is the statement submitted by the appellant on 1st November 1995.

(3.) According to the appellant the vehicle in question was used solely for his wife's rice mill business and was never let out on hire of reward and therefore it will not come under the purview of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985. It is the case of the appellant that he was given notice of hearing by the first respondent on 28th June 1995 alone and no notice was given in regard to the hearing held on 22nd July 1995, 31st August 1995 and 1st November 1995 and that the first respondent without conducting the enquiry passed the order under Exts. P-4, P-5 and P-6. Two contentions were raised before us by the learned counsel for the appellant. The first contention relates to the jurisdiction of the first respondent, District Executive Officer to decide Exts. P-4 to P-6. According to the appellant the first respondent is not an officer appointed under S.7 of the Act and also does not have the authorisation of the Chief Executive Officer as contemplated by S.8 of the Act. The second contention relates to the passing of orders by the first respondent under Exts. P-4 to P-6. It is submitted that the said orders have been passed without observing the principles of natural justice and therefore the said orders are bad in law in view of S.8(4) of the Act.