(1.) Respondents in the Original Petition are the appellants. The petitioner in the Original Petition/ respondent herein is an employee in the service of the appellants. Ext. P-1 is the memo of charges issued to him initiating disciplinary action. Ext. P-4 is the order passed by the disciplinary authority imposing punishment of "censure" and "recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the bank" by negligence as envisaged under Regulation.4 (a) and 4 (a) respectively of the Canara Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (for short 'the Regulations'). Ext. P-6 is the order passed by the Appellate Authority confirming Ext. P-4 and Ext. P-9 is the order passed on a review petition confirming Exts. P-4 and P-6. The challenge in the Original Petition was directed against Exts. P1, P-4, P-6 and P-9. One of the contentions raised by the respondent/petitioner in the original petition is that even if the misconduct has been proved, the disciplinary authority cannot impose two penalties. According to him, the disciplinary authority can impose only one among the penalties which he may choose in the nature of the offence. Therefore, he would contend that Ext. P-4 in so far as it imposes two penalties for the same misconduct and the subsequent orders confirming Ext. P-4 are illegal. Learned Single Judge accepted the aforesaid contention and quashed Ext. P-4 and further directed the third respondent in the Original Petition to pass fresh orders choosing either of the said two minor penalties to be imposed on the petitioner. This appeal is directed against the aforesaid Judgment of the learned Single Judge.
(2.) Having heard learned counsel on both sides, we are of opinion that the Judgment appealed against cannot be sustained. The minor penalties are provided in Regulation.4. The said regulation in so far as it prescribes minor penalty reads as follows:
(3.) The language used by the rule making authority in sub-regulation 3 of Regulation.7 is that the disciplinary authority can impose any of the penalties. According to us, the word 'any' in this sub-regulation taking into consideration the context in which it is used and the subject matter of the Statute would only mean 'all' or 'every' or 'some' and at any rate, not one. We cannot loss sight of the fact that the regulation in question pertains to a banking institution which is custodian of other people's money and when it suffers a pecuniary loss as in the present case because of negligence on the part of the delinquent who is entrusted with the money, bank cannot just censure its employees without taking measures to recover the same from him either from his pay or from any other amounts due to him because it is accountable to the customers' money. Therefore, invocation of one penalty does not preclude resorting to other penalty. If the contention of the delinquent employee/respondent that the disciplinary authority is competent to impose only one of the penalties specified in the regulation is accepted, it would certainly lead to anomalous consequences disabling the banking institutions from realising the loss suffered by it from the employees. Analysing the regulation in the context in which it occurs, we have no hesitation in accepting the contention of the appellants and holding that the disciplinary authority has every right to impose every one of the penalties mentioned in the Regulation.