DISTRICT SUPDT OF POLICE Vs. GEORGE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners in CMP No. 7017/95 in O. P. 5879/93 are the appellants. They figure as respondents 1 to 4 in the Original Petition which was one filed for a direction for police protection to enable the respondents herein/petitioners in the Original Petition to carry on their business of manufacture of hollow bricks peacefully and without being obstructed by anyone and in particular, respondents 5 to 22 in the Original Petition. The respondents herein filed the aforesaid Original Petition for directing the appellants herein viz. the police to afford adequate police protection to their life and property and also for transporting the materials into and finished products outside their industrial unit, viz., St. Mary's Hollow Bricks without being obstructed by anybody. This Court by judgment dated 15.6.1993 in O. P. No. 5879/93 directed the appellants herein to afford adequate police protection to the respondents/petitioners for their life and property and for their industrial unit so as to enable them to transport the bricks into and out of the premises of the said industrial unit. The appellants were also directed to give necessary protection to ensure that materials from the factory reach their destination without obstruction from respondents 5 to 22 in the Original Petition. As per the said direction police protection was granted to the respondents herein from 15.6.1993 onwards. In these circumstances, the appellants filed CMP No. 7017/95 in the Original Petition praying for a direction to the respondents herein who are the petitioners in the Original Petition to pay charges to the Government for the police protection afforded to them from 15.6.1993 and for continuous protection. A learned Single Judge as per the order impugned in this Writ Appeal, dismissed the CMP observing that:

(2.) Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the learned Single Judge the appellants have moved this Writ Appeal. Having heard learned counsel on both sides, we are not persuaded to interfere with the order under challenge. As already observed, O. P. No. 5879/93 was disposed of as per judgment dated 15.6.1993 directing the appellants to afford police protection to the respondents herein to run their industrial undertaking and also to their life. About 21 months thereafter, CMP No. 7017/95 was filed in the Original Petition supported by an affidavit by the Sub Inspector of Police praying for a direction to the respondents herein to pay what they call as "due charges" to the Government for the protection already afforded from 15.6.1993 and for the continuous protection being provided to the respondents until police protection is altogether stopped. In our considered opinion, the claim now made by the appellants is thoroughly misconceived. The direction in the judgment dated 15.6.1993 was a writ of mandamus to the police officials to discharge their duties which they are expected to do. It was found after elaborate consideration of the respective contentions of the parties that there has been a dereliction of duty on the part of the police officials; that the very life of the petitioners/respondents herein was in danger and jeopardy on several occasions; that it is necessary to direct the police officials to give protection to the respondents to ensure that materials loaded from the factory reach their destination without being obstructed by respondents 5 to 22 in the Original Petition or their associates. This Court on a consideration of the materials brought on record found that the apprehension voiced by the respondents herein regarding serious obstruction being caused by respondents 5 to 22 in the O. P. is justified and correct; that the obstruction caused by respondents 5 to 22 was an unlawful obstruction; that the police officials were not quite diligent in discharging their duties; that there is an obligation on the part of the police officials to render adequate protection to a citizen to enable him to carry on his lawful activities without being obstructed, intimidated, threatened or prevented by obstructionists who do not have a semblance or vestige of right to interfere with such activities. Barring exceptional circumstances, we are of the opinion that the State would not be justified in claiming charges from citizens for affording police protection to remove or prevent obstruction to a lawful activity carried on by a citizen in exercise of his constitutional right. Thus, it is an integral part of the functions of the police who are repositories of statutory power to maintain law and order in a locality, which is a sovereign function incapable of being delegated. Such functions are to be exercised by the State themselves. If, therefore, maintenance of law and order is a sovereign function which belongs to the exclusive realm of the State, we fail to comprehend how the expenditure incurred by the State for discharge of such a sovereign function could be realised from a citizen for no fault of the latter. When direction is issued to the police officials to afford protection to a citizen such protection is granted by a Court only after satisfaction of certain vital circumstances viz:

(3.) Reliance placed by the appellants on the provisions of the Police Act, in our view, is misconceived. S.10 of the Police Act affords power to recover money payable under S.8 and 9 only in circumstances mentioned therein. Where a citizen has moved and approached this Court for a direction for police protection and where there is a direction to the police officials to afford protection and protection is in fact granted to the person concerned, such protection cannot be in any manner be traced to the power under S.8 and 9 of the Police Act and the contention to the contrary is baseless and unsustainable in the eye of law.