LAWS(KER)-1989-9-6

GEORGE EAPEN Vs. STATE OF KERALA

Decided On September 07, 1989
GEORGE EAPEN Appellant
V/S
STATE OF KERALA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Petitioner challenges Ext. P7 Memo of Charges and Ext. P9 order whereby he was placed under suspension pending departmental action against him. In support of the first submission, counsel relied on the decision reported in Kesavan v. State of Kerala, 1989 (1) KLT 135 . In support of his second submission counsel relied on the decision reported in N. Subramonian v. State of Kerala 1973 KLJ 31 and Veeramani v. State of Kerala, 1974 KLT 630 . I do not propose to go into the details of the facts involved in this Original Petition, because the disciplinary proceedings initiated under Ext. P7 is now pending against the petitioner. Suffice it for me to say that the allegation against the petitioner, is that Ext. P1 report which he submitted on 19-10-1976 in respect of a ceiling case which resulted in exclusion of 94 acres of Government land in Sy.No.745/1 of Kulathupuzha Village in favour of the declarant under S.85 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, was false and motivated. He submits that members of the Taluk Land Board themselves had conducted a local inspection of the area and recorded Ext. P2 report dated 30-4-1977, finding the area to be a plantation and the report to the contrary which the Tahsildar, Pathanapuram, submitted on 5-8-1977 was not accepted by the Taluk Land Board in its proceedings dated 30-4-1977. The matter was discussed at the meeting of the Taluk Land Board on 30-7-1977. In Ext. P4 order dated 31-10-1977, the Taluk Land Board granted exemption in favour of the declarant in respect of 94 acres of land as covered by plantation. The State challenged Ext. P4 order in C.R.P.No.2180 of 1978. My learned brother Khalid J., as he then was, dismissed that petition by Ext. P5 order dated 5-12-1980. This court placed reliance on Ext. P1 report of the petitioner. The State then filed S.L.P. No.2833 of 1981. The Supreme Court dismissed that application in Ext. P6 order dated 9-8-1982. Petitioner submits that his report having been accepted and acted upon by the Taluk Land Board, this court and the Supreme Court, and that being a statutory report in aid of quasi judicial proceedings of the Taluk Land Board, cannot be the subject matter of disciplinary proceedings against him. It is for that proposition that he placed reliance on Kesavan v. State of Kerala, 1989 (1) KLT 135.

(2.) The question as to whether an officer discharging quasi judicial functions under a statute can be penalised for his conduct in exercise of such powers came up for consideration before this Court in Govinda Menon v. Union of India, 1966 KLT 519 , where this court held, that the conduct of a Government servant in whatever capacity can be the subject matter of disciplinary proceedings and the only fact that the officer was discharging a quasi judicial function will not preclude the employer from resorting to such proceedings. The following observations of Mathew J., as he then was, on behalf of the majority, is relevant in this regard:

(3.) Petitioner was promoted as Deputy Tahsildar on 27-9-1974. It was while he was working as Deputy Tahsildar, Pathanapuram that he functioned as the authorised officer under S.105(A) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act and it was in that capacity that he submitted Ext. P1 report. Thereafter, he was promoted as Tahsildar on 12-11-1979 and still later as Deputy Collector on 27-5-1979. He was reverted as Tahsildar on 17-11-1979. Since 19-7-1988 he was working as Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Kallada Irrigation Project. He is due to retire from service on 30-11-1989. It was in the meantime that the Government passed Ext. P9 order on l6-11-1988. Petitioner filed this Original Petition promptly on 21-11-1988. In C.M.P.No.30597 of 1988, this court ordered interim stay of Ext. P9 order of suspension. Hence P9 order has not taken effect. Petitioner is therefore still continuing in service. He submits that he ought to have been promoted as Deputy Collector but for Ext. P9 order in the vacancy that arose subsequent to 12-1-1988. He also submits that no such circumstance which justifies his suspension is in existence now.