ULAHANNAN MATHAI Vs. TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Appeal is by plaintiffs 1 and 2, husband and wife. They are the son inlaw and daughter of Kurian Puravath, lessee of the suit property under a private deveswom taken over by the Devaswom Board. The Board obtained an order for resumption under S.14 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act in O. A. No. 761 of 1965. Appeal filed by Kurian Puravath was dismissed. In execution also, the property was ordered to be delivered rejecting his objection. His appeal against that order was also unsuccessful. Plaintiffs are claiming under Ext.A1 executed by Puravath on 6-5-1963. They filed an original petition challenging the order for resumption. The original petition, being on disputed questions of fact, was dismissed without prejudice to their right to challenge the order. That is how this suit was filed for declaration of their leasehold right and a further declaration that the orders of the Land Tribunal are null and void. They also sought permanent injunction against delivery. Devaswom contested the claim. Suit was dismissed and the decision was confirmed in appeal.

(2.) Both the courts found that during the life time of Puravath, plaintiffs had no right and Ext. Al is rather a will. The contention of the Devaswom that the suit is not maintainable for want of notice under S.55 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act was accepted by the Trial Court, but rejected by the appellate court. S.55 notice was issued. "Then a suit was filed in the District Court. It was returned for presentation before the Munsiff. That plaint was not represented. But a fresh plaint was filed on the same facts and cause of action. Devaswom took the stand that when a fresh suit is filed, a fresh notice is necessary. That is a hypertechnical stand overlooking the purpose of the notice. The notice is intended to alert the authority to negotiate a just settlement or atleast to have the courtesy of telling the potential outsider why his claim is being resisted after being informed of it. Just like the State, an institution like the Devaswom Board must have a litigative policy involving settlement of disputes in a sense of conciliation rather than in a fighting mood. The purpose of the notice is that the Devaswom should be posted in advance with the necessary information without being taken by surprise so that all steps could be taken to avoid the litigation, if possible. When such an information on all necessary points is given, it may not be proper to contend that the notice worked out when the first suit is filed and a fresh notice is necessary when a fresh plaint is filed instead of representing the original plaint. We are more concerned with the substance of the claim than the form (State of Punjab v. M/s. Geetha Iron & Brass Works Ltd., AIR 1978 SC 1608 ). The appellate court was correct in its finding that the notice is sufficient. A broad and practical outlook is necessary in such matters. If the facts and cause of action are different necessitating an independent approach the position may be different.

(3.) Then the only other two contentions are that appellants were not made parties before the Land Tribunal and the certificate of the District Collector under S.14 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act read with the Tenancy Rules regarding need of the land for the purpose of extending the place of public religious worship obtained under Act 4 of 1961 instead of Act 1 of 1964 is not proper. On the first question, both the courts found that the appellants had no interest in the property under Ext.A1 till the death of Puravath, who filed appeals on the trial sides and in execution. That finding does not require interference. Further, even a person, who is not a party before the Land Tribunal, could file an appeal. It is true that in Velappan v. Thomas ( 1979 KLT 412 ) it was held that such a right cannot be accepted as a right of appeal. The reason is that a person, who is not a party, may come to know of the order late and his right of appeal in such cases will only be subject to condonation of delay. I do not think that the effect of such a situation is to treat the right of appeal as a non existent one. Anyhow, we are not concerned with that aspect because appellants had no interest to file an appeal and their predecessor, who had the right of appeal, exercised it twice without success. Further, even if the appellants were necessary parties, the maximum they could say is that the order is not binding on them. They cannot seek a declaration that it is null and void. The order is one passed by a competent tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction.