VELUTHAKUNJU Vs. SANKARAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The short point that arises for consideration in this Civil Revision Petition filed by a judgment debtor against the order of the Execution Court rejecting his claim for no interest under S.7 of the Kerala Debtors (Temporary Relief) Act 30 of 1975 is whether the benefits conferred by a temporary statute can be claimed after the statute has ceased to be in force and if so, under What circumstances. The petitioner judgment debtor filed his objections to the execution application filed by the respondent decree holder after the repeal of Kerala Act 30 of 1975 by Kerala Ordinance 1 of 1977. The Execution Court rejected the petitioner's objections. In the order it is said:

(2.) S.7 of Act 30 of 1975 insisted that no interest shall accrue during the period mentioned in S.3 in respect of a debt due at the commencement of the Act from a debtor entitled to the benefits of S.3. Act 30 of 1975 did not contain any saving provision. The Kerala Debt Relief Ordinance 1 of 1977 which repealed Act 30 of 1975 also did not contain any saving provision. The Kerala Debt Relief Ordinance No. 9 of 1977 which was promulgated on the expiry of Ordinance No. 1 of 1977 though contained a saving provision that did not relate to Act 30 of 1975. The Kerala Debt Relief Act 17 of 1977 which replaced Ordinance No. 9 of 1977 though repealed Act 30 of 1975 also did not save any of the provisions of Act 30 of 1975. No doubt, Act 30 of 1975 was a temporary statute. It is clear from the preamble itself that the Act was meant only to give temporary relief to certain debtors. The petitioner claimed the benefits under S.7 of the Act only after the Act ceased to be in force. It cannot be said that the benefits already accrued to him when the Act was in force. As S.4 of The Interpretation and General Clauses Act 7 of 1125 is not applicable in the case of a temporary statute, a party who did not claim and establish his rights when the statute was in force cannot claim the rights under the statute after it has become an incident of the past. So, in the absence of any saving provision in Act 30 of 1975 or in the Ordinances and Act 17 of 1977 by which Act 30 of 1975 was repealed, the petitioner cannot now claim the benefits of S.7 of the Act. So, there is no scope for interference in revision.

(3.) In coming to the above conclusion I am fortified by the following authorities. In Gopi Chand v. Delhi Administration (AIR 1959 SC 609) Gajendragadkar J. (as he then was) has extracted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Patanjali Sastri J. in Krishnan v. State of Madras (AIR 1951 SC 301):