LAWS(KER)-1979-8-8

MOHAMMED KUNJU Vs. CO OPERATIVE TRIBUNAL

Decided On August 20, 1979
MOHAMMED KUNJU Appellant
V/S
CO-OPERATIVE TRIBUNAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS case is concerned with the scope and content of r. 114 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 (shortly the 'rules' ).

(2.) THE facts are not in dispute. THE petitioner against whom an award was passed under the relevant provisions of the Kerala co-operative Societies Act preferred an appeal before the first respondent, which is the Co-operative Tribunal, Trivandrum . That appeal was posted to 5-12-1973 for hearing. On that date neither the appellant nor his counsel was present. THE Tribunal thereupon posted the case to 3-1-1974 for pronouncing the judgment. On that date also the appellant and his counsel were not present. THEn there was an application for restoration at the instance of the petitioner which was dismissed for default. THEre was a further application to restore the restoration application, which also did not succeed. THE petitioner also tried his fortune before this Court through O. P. No. 2342 of 1976. This Court directed the Tribunal to reconsider the restoration application. THE first respondent-Tribunal passed Ext. P4 order holding that the restoration application cannot be allowed in View of the plain wording of R. 114 of the Rules.

(3.) IF one is to approach the dispute from the point of view of ordinary common sense, I do not think that there can be any controversy regarding the true import of the term 'hearing' before a judicial or a quasi-judicial body The hearing is by the presiding officer and what he hears is what the party or the parties have to say regarding their respective cases. When, after hearing the concerned parties, the case is posted to a date for pronouncement of the judgment or the order, as the case may be, on the later date the presiding officer is not hearing anything, but pronounces the judgment or the order. Perhaps, it can be said that it is the party who hears the judgment that is pronounced on that date. I am, therefore, unable to extend the scope of the expression 'hearing' to the stage when judgment alone remains to be pronounced by the authority which tried the case. Viewed from the angles indicated above, it cannot be said that Ext. P4 suffers from the vices pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner. This Original Petition, therefore, fails and it is hereby dismissed. No costs. . .