EAPEN PANICKER Vs. KRISHNA PANICKER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IT is true that "statutes of limitation are statutes of repose, to quiet title, to suppress frauds. They proceed upon the presumption that claims are extinguished or ought to be held extinguished whenever they are not litigated within the prescribed period " (Story's conflict of Laws, 8th Edn. , p. 794 ). But, at the same time, a statute of limitation being a statute of peace and justice, cannot be used to induce injustice, as is sought to be done in this case by the defendant who tries to evade his liability to pay a sum of Rs. 200/- to the plaintiff, having received the said sum on his account as I will presently explain. In a case like this where the substantive liability is found true, but a plea of limitation is urged by the defendant to extricate himself from that liability, the words of rankin, J. (as he then was) in Narendra Lal Khan v. Tarubala Dasi (I. L. R. 48 cal. 817, 831) are apposite: "the statutes of limitation, still less the principle of limitation, are not intended as an aid to unconscionable conduct though necessarily in securing other ends they afford scope for this" I am afraid that to uphold the plea of limitation put forward in this case is to render aid and comfort to a party guilty of unconscionable conduct.

(2.) THE plaintiff (Eapen Panicker) and the defendant (Krishna Panicker) were both interested in avoiding a certain land acquisition, since the peril was common. So far as the defendant was concerned, his anxiety was to avoid the acquisition of the land of a Devaswom of which he was the president, and so far as the plaintiff was concerned, his desire was to avoid acquisition of his own adjacent land. Together, they decided that the plaintiff should spend money to move the authorities concerned to get the acquisition proceedings dropped. In this venture money had to be spent and it was agreed that the Devaswom and the plaintiff should share the expenses equally. THE plaintiff moved Government and succeeded in averting the common danger and so, looked up to the Devaswom to contribute its half share in the expenses which, according to him, would be around Rs. 225/ -. THE defendant having been the president of the Devaswom at the relevant time and having persuaded the plaintiff to take up this common burden was expected to get a resolution passed by the Board of management of the Devaswom to pay to the plaintiff the aforesaid sum. It would appear that the defendant took a receipt for Rs. 200/-from the plaintiff to be produced before the Devaswom Board, together with a petition for getting that sum by way of contribution. It is not too clear what happened at the meeting of the General Body of the Devaswom, but, according to the evidence of pws. 2, the treasurer of the Devaswom and an advocate by profession, a sum of Rs. 200/- was agreed upon as payable and this sum was paid to the defendant to be made over to the plaintiff. Thus, an entry dated 18-9-1963 showing a payment of Rs. 200/- to the plaintiff is made in the accounts of the Devaswom. Of course, the entry speaks of a payment to the plaintiff and not to the defendant, but this is because a receipt is already produced by the defendant before the Devaswom, evidencing payment of the sum to the plaintiff. THEre is no case that the Devaswom directly paid to the plaintiff. But there is the evidence of pw. 2, accepted by the trial Court, that this amount was paid by the Devaswom to the defendant. THE plaintiff's action, for money had and received on his account, is for recovery of this sum of Rs. 200/- from the defendant. THE only point for decision, on the facts, is as to whether the defendant did receive Rs. 200/- from the Devaswom on account of the plaintiff and whether he did make that payment to the plaintiff. THE court below has found as a fact that the defendant did receive Rs. 200/- on account of the plaintiff, a finding considerably probabilised by P. W. 2's evidence and Exts. P3 to P7 proceeding from the defendant in the shape of letters and a money order. I see nothing illegal in this finding and therefore cannot interfere with it.

(3.) THE Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the suit is decreed. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their costs. Allowed. . .