V O VARKEY Vs. RTA TRICHUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner in the original petition, O. P. No.5239 of 1968, is the appellant. He is the holder of a regular permit for operating a stage carriage on the route Trichur - Chuvannamannu. This permit he obtained on transfer from PSN. Motors which held that permit formerly. Before this permit was transferred to the appellant, the Regional Transport Authority, Trichur, invited applications for the grant of a temporary permit on the route Iyyanthole - Peechi by a notification dated 2nd November. 1968. Applications were to be made before the 12th November, 1968. The 3rd respondent applied. On the 16th November PSN. Motors, the transferor of the permit to the appellant filed a written objection to the grant of the temporary permit. There were several grounds taken. One was that the re was no temporary need justifying the grant of a temporary permit on the route in question. The temporary permit was however granted to the third respondent by an order dated 27th November, 1968 and that order is Ext. P4. This order apart from dealing with the comparative merits of the various applicants for the grant of the temporary permit makes no mention whatever of either the existence of a temporary need nor does it contain a finding that one or the other of the conditions necessary for the grant of a temporary permit as envisaged by S.62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, exists. We may read S.62:

(2.) Counsel for the appellant has urged that the Regional Transport Authority functions as a quasi judicial authority even while granting a temporary permit under S.62 even though the elaborate procedure envisaged by S.57 of the Motor Vehicles Act for the grant of a regular permit need not be followed for the grant of a temporary permit. It is therefore essential that the quasi judicial authority should pass a speaking order which on the face of it should indicate that the requirements of the section have been satisfied. The learned Judge before whom this argument was advanced by the judgment under appeal rejected this contention and came to the conclusion that the statement in Ext. Rl which is the notification inviting applications dated 2nd November, 1968 will do duty for the reasons or the grounds that are to find a place in the order granting or sanctioning the permit. The question is whether the statement in the notification would be sufficient in order to justify the grant of the permit.

(3.) Whatever statement contained in the notification inviting applications can at best be only a tentative conclusion or a prima facie conclusion which would be sufficient to justify the inviting of the applications for permits. This statement can never take the place of the final conclusions that have to be reached by the authority before sanctioning the permit. This is so for more than one reason. The material on the basis of which the prima facie conclusion is reached may be defective or even may be non existent and at the time of passing the order there must be a reevaluation of such material before reaching a final conclusion. Secondly, the persons who are interested in opposing the grant must have the opportunity to satisfy the authority that the prima facie conclusion seen from the notification is a conclusion that should not be adhered to. It is therefore not at all sufficient to say that some statements have been made in the notification. The order Ext. P4, though it deals with the rival claims of the applicants has proceeded purely on the assumption that there was a temporary need as visualised by the section. The grant of a permit under S.62 cannot be on such assumptions. We have not been shown any record in the proceedings other than Ext. R1 from which it is possible for us to posit that the Regional Transport Authority had applied its mind as to the existence or otherwise of the particular need at the time of the grant or sanctioning of the permit. In this view, the order Ext. P4 cannot stand.