(1.) THE plaintiff is the appellant. The suit out of which this appeal arises is one for recovery of salary of the plaintiff from 1 April 1960 till the date of suit and also for direction to reinstate the plaintiff as a storekeeper in the Primo Pips Factory, Chavara, which was taken over by the Kerala State on 1 September 1959. Consequent on each taking over there was a scheme of retrenchment and the plaintiff was one of those who were given notice of such retrenchment. He was served with a notice on 8 April 1960 intimating him that he would stand retrenched with effect from 24 April 1960. This notice was put up on the notice-board on 25 March 1960. Though attempts were made repeatedly by the plaintiff to continue in service by representations made to Government, he did not succeed and was ultimately relieved on 14 October 1960. According to the plaintiff, such termination of his service was wrongful in that the requirements of Section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act were not kept in view and he was neither given sufficient notice as required therein nor offered the compensation payable under the said provision. Ha also challenges the order of termination as mala fide.
(2.) THE trial Court found that the suit was maintainable slice there was no provision in the Industrial Disputes Act or the Payment of Wages Act barring a suit by an individual workman for the relief's claimed in the instant suit. It also found that the retrenchment was made on valid, bona fide and reasonable grounds. It further found there was no violation of the provisions of Sections 25g and 25h of the Industrial Disputes Act in the retrenchment of the plaintiff. In this view the relief sought for by the plaintiff for a mandatory injunction to reinstate him was denied to him by the trial Court. He was given a decree for recovery of arrears of pay for the period from 1 to 24 April 1960.
(3.) THE plaintiff filed an appeal before the Subordinate Judge's Court of Quilon. The appellate Court found that notwithstanding the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act a suit for the relief's prayed for in the present case could be maintained. The appellate Court did not consider it necessary to consider the validity or otherwise of the order of retrenchment, since, if the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree reinstating him in service for any other reason, the consideration of this question become immaterial. Relying upon Section 21 (g) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, the appellate Court held that the plaintiff could have claimed only a decree for damages and the suit for reinstatement was, under the circumstances, ill conceived. It modified the decree of the trial Court holding that the plaintiff was entitled to arrears of salary for the period from 1 April to 14 October 1960, the date when he was actually relieved from service. The plaintiff has come up in appeal against this decree of the lower appellate Court.