KATHREENA Vs. TRICHUR COCHIN NATIONAL BANK LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The short question arising for decision in this Civil Revision Petition is whether an order preferring the plaintiff to the petitioner as Receiver is appealable. The suit which has given rise to this Revision petition was one for recovery of mortgage money. The plaintiff, a Bank, applied for appointment of a Receiver for the mortgaged properties, and after hearing all the parties, the Trial Court passed an order on 15-3-1957 appointing Receiver. One Kartha was appointed as Receiver There was no appeal from this order so that the finding that a Receiver had to be appointed has become final. Kartha did not furnish security as directed and he filed a memo stating that he was not prepared to act as Receiver. At that stage the plaintiff offered to act as Receiver without remuneration. The Trial Court passed an order on 10-10-1957 stating that the plaintiff would be appointed Receiver in case the plaintiff was prepared to furnish security for Rs. 1,000. Before such security was produced the 15th defendant applied stating that she was not aware of the posting of the case to 10-10-1957 and that she may be appointed as Receiver. The Trial Court dismissed her prayer and she preferred an appeal to the District Court. The learned District Judge held that the order was not appealable and the 15th defendant has preferred this Civil Revision Petition against the order of the District Judge.

(2.) The order from which the appeal was filed was neither one appointing a Receiver nor refusing to appoint one. It cannot also be treated as an order refusing to remove a receiver. All that the court was concerned with was the choice of a person as Receiver, and the Trial Court preferred the plaintiff to the 15th defendant. O.43 R.1 provides for appeals from orders under R.1 or 4 of O.40. As pointed out earlier this cannot even be treated as an order refusing to remove a Receiver since there was no effective order appointing the plaintiff as Receiver when this application was filed. It is therefore unnecessary to consider the question whether an order refusing to remove a Receiver is appealable. The District Judge was therefore right in holding that the appeal was incompetent.

(3.) As the matter has come up in revision before this court, learned, counsel for the petitioner attempted to establish that the appointment of the plaintiff as Receiver was improper and that she ought to have been appointed instead. It was observed by the Trial Court that it was incorrect to say that the order was passed without hearing the petitioner. It was also urged that the appointment of a public limited company as Receiver was not proper. There is no provision of law supporting this contention. No doubt, there is an observation in Messrs. Budhulal Jagannath v. Hirdagarh Collieries ( AIR 1942 Nag. 64 ) suggesting that it may not be desirable to appoint a limited liability company as Receiver. It is however seen from the judgment that the question did not directly arise for decision. So long as there is no bar to the appointment of a limited liability company as Receiver, I am not inclined to set aside the order on this ground. The Trial Court has observed that the petition for appointment of Receiver came up for consideration on several occasions and that the only objection pressed by the present petitioner against the appointment of the plaintiff as Receiver was that security should be taken. In view of this, there is no case for the petitioner on the merits either. The order does not therefore call for interference.