VASUDEVAN ASHTAMOORTHI NAMBOODIRI Vs. RAMAYYAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I think that the Trial Court was right in allowing and the appellate court wrong in refusing, the 1st plaintiff-1st petitioner's application for a temporary injunction under O.XXXIX R.2 of the Civil Procedure Code.

(2.) Plaintiffs 1 and 2 are admittedly the hereditary trustees of a temple over the management of which the Devaswom Board exercises superintendence under S.37(2) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950. The defendant is a paid manager appointed by plaintiffs 1 and 2 in 1949 with the approval of the Devaswom Board, and the terms of his appointment are embodied in the registered agreement, Ext. P. 1. (The 3rd plaintiff is only a creature of plaintiffs 1 and 2 and may well be ignored). There was no term specified for the defendant's appointment but under clause 18 of the agreement, the plaintiff trustees could terminate his services by registered notice for breach of duty. In purported exercise of the power under this clause, the plaintiffs issued , notice to the defendant on 5-3-1130 (22-10-1954) terminating his services. But, this notwithstanding, the defendant declined to remit office and he continued to function as the manager in defiance of the plaintiffs. In November 1955, the plaintiffs came forward with their present suit for removing the defendant from management, for recovery of the records of the temple, and for rendition of accounts. They also asked for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from performing any act of management and, pending the suit, made the present application for a temporary injunction for the same purpose.

(3.) The defendant's case is that his dismissal was wrongful and that there was no breach of duty on his part entitling the plaintiffs to act under clause 18 of the agreement. Assuming that to be so, the position is, as rightly pointed out by the Trial Court, that the defendant would be entitled to damages for wrongful dismissal. The position is not that he continues in office and is entitled to manage the temple notwithstanding his dismissal. This of course assumes that the relations between the plaintiffs and the defendant are those of a master and servant which prima facie they appear to be, both because it was the plaintiffs that appointed the defendant (in their own rights as trustees and not on behalf of anyone else) and also because of the terms of the agreement, Ext. P. 1.