SUBBU CHETTIAR Vs. AYYAVU CHETTIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Criminal Revision Petition is by the accused 1 and 2 against their conviction for the offence of defamation under S.500 I.P.C and sentence of fine of Rs. 50 each (in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month) imposed therefor

(2.) The complainant is Ayyavu Chettiar. His daughter Parvathi was married on 14-11-1956 to the 2nd accused Shunmugham Chettiar who is the son of the 1st aroused Subbu Chettiar. Parvathi left her husbands house on 18-1-1957 on account, according to her, of ill treatment at the hands of the accused. On 18-3-1957 a registered notice was issued to the accused 1 and 2 through lawyer demanding maintenance for her. To this a reply Ext. P2 was caused to be sent by the accused through their lawyer denying the maintenance claim under Ext PI on account of Parvathis unchastity. Ext. P2 went further and alleged that her father knew about her immoral conduct and also positively helped her in her immoral ways and that he deceived the accused into entering into the marriage alliance It was for these allegations made against him that Ayyavu Chettiar filed the complaint herein. The accused pleaded not guilty. Evidence was let in by the prosecution by examining the complainant as Pw. 1 and the registered clerk of the accuseds lawyer who sent Ext. P2 as Pw 2 and a stranger Pw. 3. Pw. 1 swore to having Ext. P2 read to him by the clerk of his lawyer, because it was written in Malayalam language which he did not know. He denied the allegations against him contained in Ext. P2. Pw. 2 spoke to the issue of Ext. P2 by his master under instructions and his own writing of it. Pw. 3 spoke to his acquaintance with Pw. 1. The 1st accused in his statement under S.342 Criminal Procedure Code admitted to his having gone to his Vakil in respect of Ext P1 but he said that it was on the next day that Ext. P2 was sent and it was not he but his clerk that instructed the vakil in the matter. The second accused when questioned stated that he had no knowledge about the receipt of Ext. P1 or the if sue of Ext. P2 and had nothing to do with the allegations therein. The defence let in the evidence of Dw. 1 to Dw. 4 to prove the misconduct of Parvathi but they were unable to make out anything of significance against Pw. 1. On the above evidence the learned District Magistrate of Palghat before whom the case came on for trial held that the 1st accuseds statement that his clerk gave instructions for the preparation of Ext. P2 was totally unacceptable and the responsibility for the allegations made in Ext. P2 was on the accused themselves. He further held that the plea of justification by truth or that under Exception 9 to S.499 had no substance. In the result he convicted and sentenced the accused as I have already mentioned and hence this revision.

(3.) Mr. P. Govinda Menon learned counsel appearing for the accused before me took two points [i] that the court below has wrongly refused to apply Exception 9 to S.499, [ii] that the authorship of the accused as regards the defamatory matter in Ext. P2 cannot be said to have been established in the case. On the 1st question it has to be remembered that the Exception relates to private communication which a person makes in good faith for the protection of his own interests or of any other person or for the public good. There can be no question here of protection of the accuseds interests as against Pw. 1. Nor is there an iota of good faith. For whatever might be the character of Parvathi the daughter of Pw. 1, there was absolutely no reason to indulge in the defamatory statement against Pw. 1 that he knew about her immoral conduct and even encouraged her in such conduct. This aspect is therefore found against the accused. The next question is whether the accused are the authors as found by the court below It is no doubt true, in this connection that Ext. P2 mentions that it was issued by counsel under instructions and Pw. 2 further gave evidence that there were instructions in the matter. But who exactly, viz., whether it was the 1st or the second accused or both who gave the instructions, is not seen in Ext P2 nor was it made clear by Pw. 2. The question was one for proof particularly as the 1st accused put forward his clerk as the one who gave instructions and the 2nd accused denied all part in ii. Counsel who issued Ext. P2 did not testify in the matter and indeed could not in the face of the prohibition imposed by S.126 of the Evidence Act against disclosure of such communications. Thus in Palaniappa Chettiar v. Emperor, 1935 M. W. N. 460, where the accused was charged with defamation because his Vakil put a defamatory question to the complainant and the vakil gave evidence that he did so on the instructions of his client, it was held by Burn, J. that the instructions concerned were inadmissible under S.126, Evidence Act and the accused was not guilty of defamation committed as it were by proxy through the mouth of his vakil. Similarly in Saukhi Gope v. Uchit Rai, AIR 1948 Pat. 56, where also a party to a judicial proceedings was charged under S.499 for the alleged defamatory questions put by his counsel in cross examination, it was held that it was not possible to assume that the questions were put upon definite instructions.