(1.) This is a petition for a writ of certiorari, or other appropriate direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution quashing Ext. P-5, a memorandum, said to have been passed by the second respondent, the Director of Upper and Lower Primary Schools, Trivandrum, calling upon the first petitioner who is the manager of an Upper Primary School concluded under the Private Secondary School Scheme or the P. S. S. Scheme to relieve the second petitioner who had been appointed by him an the headmaster of the school, and to appoint the fourth respondent in his place. The Director of Public Instruction was afterwards impleaded as the fifth respondent, respondents 1 and 3 being respectively the State of Kerala and the Assistant Educational Officer, Kottayam West. The office of the headmaster in the school fell vacant at the commencement of the midsummer recess in the year 1958, on the 29th March. After the school reopened the first petitioner appointed the second petitioner a 'trained graduate, meaning a graduate who has passed the B. T. Examination, as headmaster on 7-7-1958, apparently on the basis of a Government Order dated 10-6-1958, Ext. P, which prescribed that from the commencement of the academic year 1958-59, i.e., from about June, 1958, only 'trained graduates' could be so appointed.
(2.) The fourth respondent had passed the M. A. degree examination and also had experience in training as a teacher, or had passed the T.T.C., as it is called, out is not a 'trained graduate'; he had been working as a teacher and his preferential claim for appointment, strictly promotion, as headmaster was recognised by Ext. P-5 on the strength of a Government Order. Ext. P-4, dated 10-7-1957, which was declared to be in force at the material time. The petitioners' contention is that Ext. P-4 does not prescribe the qualification for appointment as headmaster and has nothing to do with it. The learned Government Pleader who appeared for respondents 1 to 3 and 5, and the learned counsel who appeared for the fourth respondent, did not support Ext. P-5 on the ground on which it was based by the department, but attempted to maintain it on other grounds. In my opinion, it is not necessary to deal with the question raised, as this petition must fail on a preliminary ground.
(3.) The learned counsel for the fourth respondent has taken the objection, that Ext. P-5 is but an executive or administrative order, and is not therefore amenable to judicial review. It was not disputed, that no certiorari can issue to quash an administrative order; but the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that it is quasi-judicial in nature, and that in any event, a direction or order under Article 226, could issue, in respect of an administrative order.