RAMAKRISHNAN Vs. STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNALERNAKULAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These two Original Petitions have been filed under Art.226 of the Constitution, for quashing two interlocutory orders passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam, in two appeals pending before it, staying the operation of two orders passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Palghat, by which it granted permits to the petitioners, to operate their stage carriages. The petitions are founded chiefly on two grounds, first that the orders sought to be quashed suffer from a jurisdictional defect, which is common to both of them, and secondly, that, they are vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record.

(2.) The operative part of the impugned order, Ext. P-1, in O. P. 1194 of 1959 says pending appeal, it will be very hard to permit the grantee to put his vehicle into operation on the basis of the order. I am therefore constrained to pass an order of stay in all the above petitions and the operative part of the impugned order, Ext. A-1, in O. P. 1196 of 1959 says if the 12th applicant (the petitioner in O.P. 1196 of 1959) is permitted to put his bus into operation, the petitioners will be prejudiced. There is no public inconvenience if the operation of the order as against the 12th applicant is stayed pending appea ............ The petition for stay as against the 12th applicant. The Palghat District Motor Transport Cooperative Society Ltd. is allowed granting a stay of the operation of the order as against it only. The scope and effect of the two orders are far from clear, but counsel were all agreed before me that they are such as to stop the further running of the stage carriages on the routes covered by the permits, and I shall therefore proceed to decide the petitions on the above basis. It would appear, that pursuant to the orders passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Palghat, which are the subject of the appeals before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, permits had been issued to the petitioners, and they had accordingly put their vehicles on the road, towards the end of last month, and have been operating the services ever since.

(3.) The first contention of the petitioners was that after the issue of the permits to them, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make any order so as to suspend the operation of the permits, or to prevent the running of the stage carriages; a further contention was raised by counsel in O.P. 1194 of 1959, that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal has no power even to stay the operation of the orders granting the permits, and on that ground too, the orders impugned have been made without jurisdiction. The second contention was, that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal either failed to advert to the fact, which was on record before it, that the petitioners had put their vehicles on the road, or if it was aware of it, did not attach any weight to it, before proceeding to prevent the operation of the services, both of which constitute errors apparent on the face of the record. It seems to me, upon the arguments addressed, that the case has to be decided on the jurisdictional issue, for on that matter, the leading counsel Shri V.K.K. Menon, who appeared for some of the counter petitioners, took the definite stand before me, that if an inferior tribunal acts in excess of its jurisdiction, this court can and ought under Art.226 of the Constitution, to keep it within bounds and quash the order so passed, even though interlocutory in character, and he cited several cases in which interlocutory orders were interfered with on this ground. His point, however, was that there is no such defect in the orders impugned, because, as he put it, the operation of the permit, which is the material thing, and not the operation of the services, is dependent on the continued force and operation of the orders granting the permits; and that whatever affects the orders would necessarily affect the permits. It is this question which falls to be determined in these petitions. I therefore refrain from considering the broader question, whether, even if a jurisdictional defect exists, this court is bound to interfere.