DAMODARAN Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are one hundred and eighty-two petitions under Art.226 of the Constitution preferred by operators of stage carriages on several routes in the erstwhile Travancore - Cochin State, for the issue of a writ of certiorari, or other appropriate writ, direction or order, quashing the notification, TB-2/14667/57/PW dated the 24th September, 1957, made by Government, by virtue of the power conferred on them by S.18(l) of the Travancore - Cochin Vehicles Taxation Act, 1950, referred to hereinafter as the Act. The Act has provided for the levy of a tax on every vehicle using any public road in the Travancore - Cochin area, and has prescribed in Schedules I and III thereof, the maximum tax leviable for each class of vehicles. S.3, sub-s.(1) and (2) of the Act authorised Government, to specify, by notification inter alia the rate at which, the tax shall be levied for each class of vehicles, which, under the proviso to that section, shall not exceed the maxima specified in Schedule I in the case of motor vehicles, and the maxima specified in Schedule III in the case of vehicles other than motor vehicles. Pursuant to this, Government issued notifications specifying the rates at which tax was to be levied, which, for certain classes of vehicles, were lower than the corresponding maxima specified in the Act. S.18 of the Act provided as follows:-

(2.) The chief contention of the petitioners was, that the delegation of power to Government under S.18 (1) of the Act to alter, add to, cancel in part or the whole of Schedule I, II or III exceeded the permissible limits, and is invalid, and that the impugned notification is therefore, ultra vires, Some of the petitioners have also contended, that the Act, imposing as it does, a restriction on trade, commerce and inter course, within the meaning of clause (b) of Art.304 of the Constitution, is wholly void, not having been passed after complying with the condition prescribed by the proviso to that clause, which reads:

(3.) At the outset, it is necessary to dispose of an argument, advanced on behalf of a few of the petitioners with some earnestness, that S.18 (1) of the Act must be read subject to the proviso to S.3, on the principle of harmonious construction of different parts of a statute, that so understood, S.18 (1) could not be deemed to confer a power on Government, to enhance the maxima specified in Schedule.1 and III of the Act and that therefore the notification is ultra vires. There is no substance in this argument. The proviso to S.3 was intended to confine the power delegated to Government under S.3 (1) and (2), which was to fix the rates of the tax, within prescribed limits, while S.18 (1) was inserted to delegate to Government, a different power, which was to alter the limits themselves to any extent. There could be no conceivable objection to the former delegation, under S.3 (1) and (2), while the objection raised to the latter delegation under S.18 (1) deserves close examination. However this may be, it is clear, that the purpose intended to be served are distinct and different, and the two provisions can very well stand together, whatever be their validity. There is no disharmony between them, and therefore no scope, for applying the principle of construction referred to. Textually also, the construction is inadmissible, for, on a plain reading, S.18 (1) warrants any kind of alteration of Schedules I to III being made including their cancellation, and substitution by different schedules. Conversely, if as the contention assumes the maxima prescribed in Schedules I and III are unalterable, the proviso to S.3 alone would have sufficed, and there was no need for the conferment of a further power by S.18 (1) in such wide terms. The learned Government Pleader was of course not prepared to accept this restricted interpretation of S.18 (1), but contended for the absolute power of Government under it, not only to make any alterations in the schedules, but also to supersede them wholly and substitute others in their stead, should the need arise. We think, that S.18(1) does in terms purport to confer such power on Government.