KRISANA PILLAI Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These petitions are to revise two orders passed by the Sessions Judge at Trivandrum, in two cases in which the Public Prosecutor had preferred two complaints under S.198 B of the Criminal Procedure Code, for offences of defamation alleged to have been committed by the respective accused, against a public servant, who, at the relevant time, was holding office as Secretary to Government, Home Department. The Public Prosecutor produced two orders of sanction authorising the prosecution, which were signed By order of The Governor-signed-Secretary to the Council of Ministers and Chief Secretary. In Sankar v. State 1958 KLT 1158 , which arose on a complaint preferred by the Public Prosecutor on behalf of one of the Ministers of the State Government the view was taken by a bench of this court, that a sanction signed in the above manner was not one in accordance with S.198 B (3) (b), Crl. P. C. and though the question did not directly arise, an opinion was expressed by the bench, that such a sanction might answer the purpose of clause (c) of Sub-s.(3). This decision was rendered on the 28th November, 1958. Shortly after, the Public Prosecutor applied to the Sessions Court for the withdrawal of the two complaints, and for preferring two fresh complaints on the same matter, supported by appropriate sanctions. In the petitions for withdrawal, it was stated, that in view of the decision of the High Court in Sankar v. State the Public Prosecutor apprehended, that the orders of sanction produced along with the original complaints may not suffice. The withdrawal of the complaints, though objected to, was allowed. Upon the fresh complaints, being registered, the accused in the two cases filed two petitions for rejecting them, on the ground, that they constituted an abuse of the process of court. The Sessions Judge has rejected these petitions by the orders now sought to be revised.

(2.) The first argument addressed before me by the learned counsel on behalf of the revision-petitioners is, that the orders of sanction originally produced were sufficient for the purpose of sub-s.(3) (c) of S.198-B, Crl. P.C. which applies to this case.

(3.) The next question is, whether the presentation of fresh complaints amounted to an abuse of the process of court. It was not disputed, that S.403, Crl. P.C. has no application to this case. But the argument was, that under S.561-A, Crl. P.C. the court has inherent power to reject a complaint filed without any bona fides, and solely for the purpose of causing harassment to the opposite party. Cases were relied on by the learned counsel before me, particularly the decision in James Nadar v. Joshua, 1950 T.C.L.R. 18, in which a second complaint was thrown out on this ground ; but the facts there are different. In that case, the original complaint for abduction was dismissed under S.201 of the Travancore Criminal Procedure Code, corresponding to S.203 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code as lacking in bona fides. After a child was born to the woman alleged to have been abducted, a second complaint was preferred on the same set of facts, and this was rejected on the ground, that it constituted an abuse of the process of court. Other decisions were also cited, in which complaints were dismissed under S.203, and notwithstanding the dismissal, fresh complaints were filed and rejected on the same ground. In these cases, the intention to cause annoyance to the opposite party was manifest, and they are distinguishable. On the other hand, it has been held by the Supreme Court in Baij Nath Prasad v. State of Bhopal, AIR 1957 S. C. 494 that when the original complaint was proceeded with and the case ended in acquittal for want of a proper sanction, then a fresh complaint supported by a proper sanction could be entertained. It is true, that the question of harassment to the opposite party, or of an abuse of the process of court, was not directly raised in that case or decided. In the present case, beyond filing the complaints no further steps had been taken and as soon as the decision of this court was rendered in Sankar v. State the Public Prosecutor thought that the original sanction might be impugned as defective, and that a fresh sanction might be produced and fresh complaints instituted. No witness had been examined. I find it extremely difficult to hold, that the presentation of the two complaints in such circumstances can amount, in any sense of the term, to an abuse of the process of court.