SATHYAN Vs. STATE OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Petitioner is a member of the Board of Directors of the 3rd Respondent. The 3rd Respondent is a central society under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. The members of the 3rd Respondent Society are Primary Dairy Co-operative Societies. The Petitioner was the Chairman of one of the member Societies of the 3rd Respondent and in the said capacity he was elected to the Board of Directors of the 3rd Respondent. Ext. P-1 are the bye-laws of the 3rd Respondent. The 2nd Respondent, acting under Rule 44(3) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, disqualified the Petitioner on the ground that the Society which the Petitioner represented did not supply the requisite quantity of milk during the year subsequent to the election. The Petitioner was elected on 31-8-2005. Thus, acting on the complaint of the 4th Respondent, it was found by the 2nd Respondent that for the year 2005-06 the primary society, of which the Petitioner is the Chairman, did not supply the requisite quantity of milk. It is at once necessary to notice the two bye-laws in Ext. P-1 which are at the centre of the controversy. They are Clause 19.5 and Clause 20 which read as follows:

(2.) The Petitioner preferred Ext. P-8 appeal before the Government. The appeal was unsuccessful as by Ext. P-9 order the Government took the following view.

(3.) I heard learned Counsel for the Petitioner, learned Government Pleader and learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the 3rd Respondent. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner raised before me essentially three points. He would submit that the breach of Clause 20.2.9 cannot be made the basis for disqualifying the person who has been elected to the Board of Directors of the 3rd Respondent. He amplifies this by pointing out that having regard to the wording of Clause 20.2.9, it is apposite and relevant only to decide the question of disqualification of a member from standing for an election. In this case, admittedly, the Petitioner stood for election and was elected in the election held on 31-8-2005 and, therefore, having regard to the use of the words 'preceding year' in Clause 20.2.9, it is clearly impermissible for the 2nd Respondent as also the Government in appeal to take the view that it can still be drawn upon for the purpose of holding that the Petitioner was disqualified to continue as a member. Secondly, learned Counsel for the Petitioner would contend that having regard to the language of Clause 19.5, it speaks of act on the part of the elected member of the Society or the Society who acted in a manner causing any breach of the bye-law. According to him, even assuming that Clause 20.2.9 can be roped in employing Clause 19.5, it is the indispensable requirement of Clause 19.5 and there must be an act attributed to the Petitioner or the Society which he represented which in turn results in the breach of the provisions of Clause 20 of Ext. P-1. No act or omission is attributed against the Petitioner, it is contended and, therefore, even assuming that there is a breach but without there being an act the requirement of Clause 19.5 is not fulfilled, runs the contention. Thirdly, it is contended that the 3rd Respondent does not have volume measurement of the milk and it has the weight measurement of the milk supplied and as the density of milk is not the same and it varies from animal to animal, the weight measurement cannot be converted to volume measurement. Therefore, there is no basis for finding that the Petitioner is liable to be treated as disqualified under Clause 19.5 read with Clause 20.2.9, he submits. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner would further contend that as there is a clear ambiguity in the provision, the ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the person as the Petitioner is being deprived of to continue as a member. He seeks support from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes. Therein, the author states as follows: