K V MUHAMMED KUNHI Vs. P JANARDHANAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This case has been filed by one Muhammed Kunhi, accused in C.C. No. 582 of 1995 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate - I, Hosdurg, against one Janardhanan, respondent herein, who is the complainant in the above said C.C.

(2.) The facts as narrated by both the counsel can be shortly summarised hereunder: A cheque dated 17.11.1994 was drawn by the petitioner for a sum of Rs. 75,000/- in favour of the respondent. The cheque was presented in the Bank on 17.5.1995 for collection. No doubt, the cheque was returned for insufficiency of funds. Apart from the above common case of both sides, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the cheque had been presented in the Bank after the expiry of six months and therefore, it is barred by limitation as contemplated under S.138 proviso (a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). When the cheque is barred as per the above provision, no criminal prosecution can be launched against the petitioner. On this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, a petition, C.M.P. No. 8609 of 1996, was moved before the Magistrate to discharge the petitioner accused as the criminal prosecution has come up before the Magistrate only after the expiry of the period of limitation. The Magistrate dismissed the petition on 30.10.1996 on the view that on account of the days of the British calender month as defined in S.3(35) of the General Clauses Act, the cheque had been presented in the Bank within the time prescribed. Now, the above order of the Magistrate is being challenged in this Court under S.482 Crl. P.C. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent complaint, on the other hand, would be that as per S.9 of the General Clauses Act the date of cheque, namely 17.11.1994 must be excluded in reckoning the period of limitation. When such a calculation is adopted, the cheque has been presented in the Bank within the time of six months. It is also the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that the word 'month' defined in S.3(35) of the General Clauses Act can be taken as a lunar month and not as a British calender month. In support of this argument he also relies upon some citations which I will look into a little later.

(3.) Now I will consider the point with reference to the date from which the period of limitation has to be reckoned. S.9 of the General Clauses Act reads as follows: