STATE OF KERALA Vs. RAMANIAMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The sole question arises for decision in this appeal is whether the worker Sri. Nagappan Nair died arising out of and in the course of employment under 2nd appellant. The appellants before us are the State of Kerala and the Assistant Director of Dairy Development, Quality Control Officer, Quality Control Unit, Trivandrum. The respondents are the legal representatives and dependants of Sri. Nagappan Nair who died on 20-3-1990 due to heart attack. An application has been filed by the respondents under S.22 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (for short 'the Act') claiming compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/-. After the enquiry the Commissioner found that Nagappan Nair died in the course of employment having sustained the injuries resulting in his death. Consequently, commissioner awarded a compensation of Rs. 65,228/- with 6% interest.

(2.) The Government Pleader on behalf of the appellants argued before us that the finding of the Commissioner that Nagappan Nair died in the course of employment was not correct and therefore the compensation awarded by the Commissioner could not be sustained. At the outset it must be recalled that we are dealing with an appeal filed under S.30 of the Act. The proviso to said section mandates that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. As a matter of fact, even though the appellants have challenged the impugned order of the Commissioner, no substantial question of law as such has been framed in the appeal memo. When there is such mandate in the section it is essential to frame the question of law so as to consider by this court whether such questions did actually arise for decision. However, the Government Pleader submitted that the substantial question of law involved is whether the facts and circumstances of this case would justify the Commissioner to hold that Nagappan Nair died in the course of his employment. In this context it is worthwhile to examine the evidence of A.Ws. 2 and 3 who are the coworkers of the deceased. A.W. 2 Sri. Vijayakumaran Nair deposed that he visited the office of the deceased on 8-3-1990 to recommend Sri. Sivankutty to take a L.I.C. policy through Sri. Gokulan, A.W. 3. He further deposed that at that time Sri. Nagappan Nair came there with his vehicle and after keeping it in the garage he came out placing his hand on the chest and stating that he was suffering from severe chest pain. He wanted to go to hospital. After applying for leave A.W. 3 took him to hospital along with Sri. Gokulan and two of his coworkers. The appellants admitted that the deceased was present in the office on 8-3-1990 and applied for leave from 9-3-1990 to 21-3-1990. The Commissioner relied on the evidence of A.Ws. 2 and 3 and also the documentary evidence. After evaluating the entire evidence on record the Commissioner came to a positive conclusion that the deceased Nagappan Nair died in the course of employment having sustained injuries resulting in death. Thus, what is before us is a finding of fact entered by the Commissioner on the basis of the cogent materials on record. In the aforesaid premise, we do not see any question of law much less substantial question is involved in this case attracting interference by this court under S.30.

(3.) The learned counsel for the respondents has brought to our notice a Division Bench decision of this court in V. Raveendran v. B. Somavally and Others ( 1995 (2) KLJ 319 ). In the above decision it is laid down that a finding recorded by the Commissioner, on taking a particular view of the evidence, cannot be questioned howsoever erroneous, as no question of law can be said to have arisen in such cases. The Commissioner while handling cases under the Act has to deal with the evidence tendered by the claimants and on evaluation of entire evidence, findings have to be entered and such findings cannot be called in question invoking the power under S.30 of the Act unless a substantial question of law is arising from such findings. It is axiomatic that when there is no question of law, there cannot have any question of general public importance or any question directly and substantially affecting the rights of parties.