VINCENT VARGHESE Vs. STATE BANK OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner has approached this Court challenging Ext. P8 and seeking a declaration that he is entitled to be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits. He also seeks a direction for reinstatement. Exst. P8 is an order passed in an appeal filed by the petitioner against Ext. P6, whereby the petitioner was discharged from service on the reason that he had committed an offence involving moral turpitude. That order is confirmed by Ext. P8 dismissing the appeal of the petitioner. It is in the above circumstances that he has approached this Court.

(2.) IT is an admitted fact that the petitioner had been prosecuted for commission of offence under Section 498-A and that he had been convicted for imprisonment as well as for punishment of fine. That punishment was upheld by the appellate Court. In revision, this Court also upheld the conviction but he was given the benefit of Section 4 (1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Though the conviction was upheld, he did not undergo the imprisonment. On the ground that the offence in which the petitioner was found guilty by a criminal Court was one involving moral turpitude, departmental proceedings were initiated against the petitioner which finally resulted in Ext. P6 order of the disciplinary authority discharging the petitioner from service. That order was challenged by the petitioner in O. P. 14480/1995. That was disposed of relegating the petitioner to the appellate remedy available to him. Accordingly, petitioner resorted to that appellate remedy and his appeal was dismissed as per Ext. P8.

(3.) IT is contended by the counsel for the petitioner that as the petitioner had never undergone imprisonment and this Court had granted the benefit of Section 4 (1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, his case ought to have been considered with due advertance to that aspect and the maximum penalty of discharge from service ought not have been imposed and that would not have been confirmed by the appellate authority. In that respect there was no application of mind by either of the authorities. It is submitted that merely because there was a conviction in respect of an offence involving moral turpitude, the order of the disciplinary authority need not result always in dismissal. This aspect also was not considered by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority. The appellate authority also took note of certain facts and the details which had not been considered by the disciplinary authority and that too relating to a subsequent event which resulted in acquittal of the petitioner in another case.