THOMAS Vs. EASO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) AFTER the period fixed in the compromise was over, the landlord filed an execution petition namely, E. P. 3/98 before the Munsiff s court, Thodupuzha for execution of the order of the Rent Control Court . The tenant then contended that the order passed in the compromise petition is a nullity and hence the order cannot be executed. Before the executing court the certified copy of the compromise petition and the certified copy of the order in R. C. P. were produced as Exts. Al and A2. The respondent produced Exts. B1 to B10, out of which Ext. B1 the notice issued to the tenant for eviction and Ext. B 2 is the reply notice. The executing court came to the conclusion that the order of eviction was passed after the court was satisfied that the landlord needs the building for his own need. It also took the view that the tenant also admitted the bonafide need of the landlord. Hence rejecting the contention of the tenant, E. P. was allowed. Against the order in the E. P. the tenant preferred r. C. R. P. under S. 14 of the Rent Control Act before the District Court. Learned district Judge confirmed the order of the executing court. It is against the above order that the present C. R. P. is filed under S. 115 C. P. C.

(2.) SRI. K. Ravindranathan Nair, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that both the authorities have not properly understood the contents of the compromise petition and both the authorities erred in coming to the conclusion that the ground for eviction existed. Learned counsel highlighted the clause in the compromise wherein it has been admitted that no other alternate building is available and that if the tenant was evicted at that time it will affect his business. According to counsel, this aspect has not been looked into by the courts below. What the courts below considered is only the fact that the tenant had admitted the need of the landlord. But that is not enough. Under S. 11 (3) of the Act, the Court can order eviction only if it is satisfied that the tenant has an alternate building- and that he does not depend on the income derived from the business conducted. Hence learned counsel submitted that the decree is not executable.

(3.) WHEN we examine the facts of the case on the above basis, the following circumstances exist. 1) The tenant admits that the landlord requires the building bonafide for his dependent. 2) The tenant has no objection in vacating the building within a stipulated time. 3) The tenant's business will suffer and no other alternative building is available. Counsel for the respondent wants me to read the contents in paragraph (1) of the compromise petition alone. If that is read alone, it is shown that the bonafide need is admitted and the tenant only wanted some time to vacate. But paragraph (1) cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read in conjunction with paragraph (2) of the compromise petition. Paragraph (2) shows that there is no alternate building available and that if the tenant is evicted at that time, it will cause great hardship to him. The later clause shows that it will affect his business on which he depends. Thus there is evidence to show that the need of the landlord is bonafide and also there is evidence to show that the tenant is entitled to the benefit of the proviso. In those circumstances, the Rent Control Court was not be justified in ordering eviction. Hence I am of the view that the order of eviction passed is not in conformity with the provisions of the Rent Control Act. There has been no satisfaction as the question whether the tenant is liable to be evicted. In other words, the order is nullity. In the above view of the facts, the orders of the court below are set aside. C. R. P. is allowed and the E. P. is dismissed. . .