A.N. RAVEENDRAN NAIR Vs. STATE AND ANR.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE revision Petitioner has been convicted under Section 16(1)(c) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000 and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. The conviction and sentence have been confirmed by the appellate Court. Hence this revision.

(2.) P .W. 1 is the Food Inspector, Chenganacherry Circle. He laid the complaint before the trial Court against the revision Petitioner. There is no dispute that the revision Petitioner is the owner of a provision shop in building No. V -398 of Kangazha Panchayat. There is also no dispute that Food Inspector visited the shop on 11th October 1983 at about 11.30 a.m. According to the Food Inspector, he found 3kgs. of coconut oil kept in a tin container of 15 kgs. displayed for sale in the shop. After informing the revision Petitioner about his official status and his intention to purchase the sample of coconut oil for the purpose of analysis, he tendered form VI notice to the shop keeper, but the latter refused to accept the notice and refused to sell the sample of coconut oil and further removed the coconut oil, kept it somewhere else and returned to the shop. The District Food Inspector, P.W. 2, was also present on that occasion. So also the Peon of the Food Inspector. It appears P.Ws. 1 and 2 had consultation with each other on the future step to be taken. They decided not to involve the Police at that stage, but sent information to the Executive Officer of the local Pahchayat, P.W. 3. P.W. 3 rushed to the scene and unsuccessfully tried to persuade the revision Petitioner to sell the sample of coconut oil to the Food Inspector. Ultimately P.W. 1 prepared Ext. P -1 scene mahazar signed by himself, P.Ws. 2, 3 and others. In due course he laid the complaint.

(3.) LEARNED Counsel for the revision Petitioner relying on a decision of Fathima Beevi, J. in Joy v. Food Inspector, 1987 (1) K.L.T. 348 contended that there is only uncorroborated testimony of P.W. 1 in this case and the same should not have been relied upon. In the above case also there was an allegation of preventing the Food Inspector from taking the sample. The Food Inspector and his Peon were examined in the case. The learned Judge took the view that the Food Inspector's evidence required corroboration and in the absence of corroboration, it should not be acted upon. There is nothing in the judgment to indicate that the learned Judge intended to lay down a general proposition of invariable application. On the facts and circumstances of that case, evidence of the Food Inspector not corroborated by the independent witness was held to be not safe to be acted upon. I am unable to find any general proposition laid down in the case. In fact such a general proposition could not be laid down in view of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Ram Labhaya v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Anr., A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 798, Rajinder Pershad v. State of Haryana : A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 878 and a decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Food Inspector v. Prabhakaran, 1982 K.L.T. 809 where the broad principle of law has been summarised in the following manner after referring to Section 10(7) of the Act.