ALI Vs. SUFAIRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These Criminal Revision Petitions arise out of proceedings initiated under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, hereinafter referred to as the 'the Act'. Crl. R. P. 222/87 is filed by a former husband challenging the order directing him to pay maintenance during the period of iddat and a further sum as reasonable and fair compensation to the divorced lady. Crl. R.P. Nos. 90/88 and 150/88 arise out of one and the same proceeding. The divorced woman filed a petition before the learned Magistrate u/s 3 of the Act claiming a sum of Rs. 3,00,00/- towards reasonable and fair provision for her life. Rs. 22,500/- towards maintenance for the period of iddat, Rs. 11,500/- towards the cost of five sovereigns due to her as mahr and for the return of properties mentioned in the schedule which were taken by the former husband or to pay its value amounting to Rs. 15,00,000/-. The learned Magistrate directed the former husband to pay Rs. 22,500/- by way of "reasonable and fair provision and maintenance" to be paid u/s 3(1)(a) of the Act and Rs. 451/-by way of mahr. The divorced lady challenges that order in R.P. 90/88 while the former husband has preferred Crl.R.P. 150/1988. Crl. R.P. 197/88 is at the instance of another former husband. He challenges the order passed by the learned Magistrate directing him to pay a sum of Rs. 1500/-as maintenance for the period of three months for observing iddat and Rs. 2,500/- as fair and reasonable compensation, both u/s 3(l)(a) of the Act, a sum of Rs. 3,600/-for the maintenance of the child for two years u/s 3(1)(b) of the Act, Rs. 1500/- as mahr under S.3(1)(c) and a sum of Rs. 3000/- under S.3(1)(d) of the Act. These Criminal Revision Petitions, though arise out of three different proceedings, are dealt with in this common order because same questions arise for consideration. The most important aspect that arises for consideration is regarding the extent of the liability cast on a muslim husband at the time of divorce.

(2.) In Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum & Others ( 1985 (2) SCC 556 ) the main argument raised on behalf of the ex-husband was whether the payment of maintenance upto the period of iddat plus payment of mahr contracted for, would conclude all responsibilities of the husband under the personal law which is referred to in S.127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court then went into the question whether the muslim personal law imposes no obligation upon the husband to provide for the maintenance of his divorced wife. The court took the view that the statements contained in the textbooks on Muslim Personal Law are inadequate to establish the proposition that the muslim husband is not under an obligation to provide for the maintenance of his divorced wife who is unable to maintain herself. Consequent on the said decision there arose a situation which necessitated the passing of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. S.3(1) of the Act enumerated the various rights to which a muslim woman is entitled to at the time of divorce. It reads:

(3.) It is well settled that the foremost task of a Court in the interpretation of statutes is to find out the intention of the legislature. Where the words are clear and un-ambiguous no question of contradiction may arise. It may safely be presumed that the legislature intended what the words plainly say. Even where the words of the statutes appear to be prima facie clear and un-ambiguous it may some-times be possible that the plain meaning of the words may not convey the intention of the legislature. The court should find out the intention of the legislature. The intention may be gathered from several sources. The first source from which it can be gathered is the statute itself. Then comes the preamble to the statute. Toe statement of objects and reasons for the legislation may also throw considerable light in finding out the intention. After ascertaining the intention of the legislature the court is duty bound to give the statute a purposeful or functional interpretation. The court must strive to interpret the statute as to promote and advance the object and purpose of the enactment.