SREEMAD ANANTHESWAR TEMPLE Vs. VASUDEVA KINI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner is a temple governed by the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (for short 'the Act'). The temple is governed by Ext. R1(a) scheme framed by the Sub-Court, Mangalore, in O.S. 37 of 1920 as amended by this Court in M.F.A. Nos. 511 and 548 of 1980. The first respondent was appointed as a Helke-vrithidar on 4-10-1977. Before that, he was a Watchman in the Mukhyaprana Matt attached to the temple. The Council of Trustees, in the meeting held on 28-11-1979. decided to abolish the post of Helke-vrithidar with effect from 31-1-1980. The President of the council issued Ext. P1 order dated 1-2-1980 terminating the service of the first respondent. He filed an appeal under S.49(2) of the Act before the Deputy Commissioner. That appeal was dismissed for non prosecution by Ext. P2 order dated 1-11-1980. Before the Deputy Commissioner, the petitioner had filed an affidavit indicating that the Council of Trustees decided to abolish the post to get rid of the first respondent, since be began to show carelessness in the discharge of temple duties inspite of warnings and complaints from the devotees. Ext. P1 order of termination was also sought to be justified on the basis of unauthorised absence of the petitioner from September, 1979. The Deputy Commissioner passed Ext. P2 order, apparently because the first respondent did not appear before him at Trivandrum. The first respondent had requested the Deputy Commissioner to hear the appeal at Manjeswar. But the Deputy Commissioner was not prepared to oblige him and dismissed the appeal by Ext. P2 order. The first respondent filed a further appeal under S.49(3) of the Act before the Commissioner. That was dismissed in Ext. P3 order dated 2-12-1982 as not maintainable in law. The first respondent then filed O. P. 10073/82. My learned brother M. P. Menon, J. disposed of that petition in Ext. P4 judgment holding that the appeal filed by the first respondent before the Deputy Commissioner, being a statutory appeal, ought to have been considered on merits and should not have been dismissed for alleged non prosecution. The Deputy Commissioner thereafter heard the appeal and passed Ext. P5 order dated 7-12-1985. He held that the appeal was competent, the termination of service of the first respondent was a measure of punishment, that the Board of Trustees should have obtained prior sanction of the Commissioner, according to Ext. R1(a) scheme, for such abolition and that the schedule of employees should not have been altered without departmental permission. The petitioner filed a revision petition before the Commissioner under S.18 of the Act. He dismissed that revision petition by Ext. P6 order dated 23-11-1987. Petitioner challenges Exts.P5 and P6 orders as devoid of jurisdiction and for error of law apparent on the face of the records.

(2.) The main contentions which the petitioner raises are that the 2nd respondent had no jurisdiction to pass Ext. P5 order nor the 3rd respondent to affirm that in Ext. P6 since S.49(2) of the Act was not contracted. He submits that there was no disciplinary action involved in the termination of the service of the first respondent as a consequence of the abolition of the post. He submits further that the respondent erred in assuming that the scheme enjoined that the trustees should have obtained permission of the Commissioner for abolishing the post. His last submission is that R.10 of the rules framed under S.100(2) of the Act confines only to pay and emoluments of existing officers and does not preclude the trustees from abolishing posts which are redundant in the changed circumstances.

(3.) I do not propose to go into the controversy as to whether the post of Helke-vrithidar bad become redundant in view of the practice of sending out invitations to the devotees for participation in religious functions by post instead of deputing the Helke-vrithidar in person for conveying the invitation. The Statutory Appellate Authority has gone into this question. Those findings are supported by some evidence. The sufficiency of that evidence to sustain the findings is not a matter for consideration in these proceedings. Nor do I find any perversity in the findings which may perhaps be an extra ordinary circumstances justifying interference by this Court.