BHAVANI AMMA Vs. MADHAVAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE appeals are against the decision of a learned judge and raise the question of the validity of the prevailing system of admissions to the medical colleges of this State. The grounds of attack raised in writ petitions which have given rise to these appeals, may be classified under two broad heads: attack against the reservation of a certain proportion of seats to be filled up from the geographical limits of what is generally referred to as the "malabar area" of this State; and attack basically against the scheme of admissions to the medical colleges in this State on an assessment of the merit of students drawn from different Universities, stated to be with no uniformity of standards 'in the matter of syllabus or curriculum of studies, or assessment of results. The learned judge, to state again broadly, upheld the challenge against the reservation of a proportion of seats to students from the malabar area, and held that the said reservation was unconstitutional; against which, the State and party-respondent have preferred appeals. Regarding the regulation of admission of students drawn from different Universities with no uniformity of standards, and probably, if not apparently, with no uniformity of syllabus, the learned judge held that the writ petitioners were well-founded in their submissions about the arbitrariness and inequality of the Rules regulating admissions. After examining the decisions to which reference will be made in the course of this judgment, the learned judge concluded that the principle of the decisions supported the casa of the petitioners. We may well extract the following observations of the learned judge in paragraphs 13 and 19 of his judgment: "13. All the same there is another aspect to the question. To compare the marks obtained by students of two different universities valued by different examiners on answer papers of different patterns may not be the proper mode of determining comparative merit. Even in the case of candidates appearing for the same examination of the same university there may be a cause for complain in the matter of marks awarded to the candidates. Quite often revaluation has shown that at least in some cases there is justification for the plea for such revaluation. Different examiners value the answer papers and though there is a Chief Examiner his role is quite limited, But these are inevitable and the marginal errors may have to be ignored. By and large the comparative merits of the candidates will be reflected in the marks they obtain in the examination to which all candidates are uniformly subjected to. But the same could not be said in the case of examinations conducted by two or more Universities. It is well-known that sometimes question papers are tough and sometimes valuation is liberal. Quite often valuation is guided by the percentage of pass expected in an examination. Moderation is also resorted to. While all these may work uniformly on all the candidates appearing for the same examination in the same University that could not be the case with regard to the candidates appearing for the same qualifying examination from another University writing different papers, which are valued by a different set of examiners. When comparison is between two candidates passing out from two Universities taking respect examinations of the universities the equation of candidates in matters where near-accuracy is called for becomes difficult. May be the examinations are similar and the valuation also is similar, but the other factors cannot be ruled out. If admissions to courses like medicines and Engineering is to be on the basis that the best talent is to be preferred, where students from more than one University passing the qualifying examination have to compete some method other than comparing their marks should be deviced to determine their comparative talent. " X X X X 19. It is true that in all these cases the courts were attempting to sustain the existing rules on the basis that the rules provided for valid classification, The reasoning of the courts in those cases do support the case of the petitioners. The fact remains that courts which had occasion to consider the cases of students passing from different Universities have been of the view that by its very nature the examinations taken by students from different Universities need not necessarily be of the same standard. While pass in these examinations from these Universities may be recognised as equivalent the subtleties involved in the determination of comparative merit between candidates on the basis of marks cannot be justified. Therefore the complaint of the petitioners in these cases that the State Government ought not to have regulated the admission which ought to be on the basis of talent merely on the basis of marks obtained by the candidates in the examinations conducted by the two Universities appears to be reasonable. The said rule of admission has infringed the equality clause as contended by the petitioners. "

(2.) THERE are altogether three Universities operating in this State, namely, the Kerala University, the Calicut University and the cochin University. The last of these is not an affiliating University, but is only what is called, a federal type of University for all the colleges in the city of Cochin. The first and second are the Universities with colleges affiliated to each.

(3.) WE think it necessary also to refer to the decision in Joshi v. M. B, State (AIR. 1955 SC. 334), where it was emphasised by the supreme Court that citizenship and domicile represented two different conceptions. The Court there sustained the exemption of Madhya Bharat students from payment of capitation fee for admission to the Medical Colleges as a reasonable classification based on considerations of residence or domicile and not on place of birth, and therefore not violative of Article 15 (1) of the constitution. The Court stated : "but that apart, what has to be noted is that whether the expression used is "domicile of origin" or "domicile of birth", the concept involved in it is something different from what the words "place of birth" signify. And if "domicile of birth" "and place of birth" cannot be taken as synonymous, then the prohibition enacted in Art. 15 (1) against discrimination based on place of birth cannot apply to a discrimination based on domicile. &quot (para. 6)