STATE OF KERALA Vs. RAFIA RAHIM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These appeals are against the decision of a learned Judge and raise the question of the validity of the prevailing system of admissions to the medical colleges of this State. The grounds of attack raised in writ petitions which have given rise to these appeals, may be classified under two broad heads: attack against the reservation of a certain proportion of seats to be filled up from the geographical limits of what is generally referred to as the "Malabar area" of this State; and attack basically against the scheme of admissions to the medical colleges in this State on an assessment of the merit of students drawn from different Universities, stated to be with no uniformity of standards in the matter of syllabus or curriculum of studies, or assessment of results. The learned Judge, to state again broadly, upheld the challenge against the reservation of a proportion of seats to students from the Malabar area, and held that the said reservation was unconstitutional; against which, the State and party respondent have preferred appeals. Regarding the regulation of admission of students drawn from different Universities with no uniformity of standards, and probably, if not apparently, with no uniformity of syllabus, the learned Judge held that the writ petitioners were well founded in their submissions about the arbitrariness and inequality of the Rules regulating admissions. After examining the decisions to which reference wild be made in the course of this judgment, the learned Judge concluded that the principle of the decisions supported the case of the petitioners. We may well extract the following observations of the learned Judge in Para.13 and 19 of his judgment:

(2.) There are altogether three Universities operating in this State, namely, the Kerala University, the Calicut University and the Cochin University. The last of these is not an affiliating University, but is only what is called, a federal type of University for all the colleges in the city of Cochin. The first and second are the Universities with colleges affiliated to each.

(3.) The learned Judge examined the question whether the Prospectus regulating admissions (copy Ext P2) was a State law or only an executive order. If it was the former, striking it down as violative of Art.14 could, under the present provisions of the Constitution, be done only by a Bench of Five Judges. The learned Judge held that it was only an executive or administrative order, and that be could hold that the selections ought not to have been made in accordance with it. Considering the objection as to non joinder of the selected students in the writ petitions the learned Judge was of the view that the same did not preclude the petitioners from obtaining any reliefs to which they might otherwise be entitled, (vide Para.21). This was because, in the first place, the writ petitioners had come to the court before the selections had been finalised and the list of selected candidates published, so that the selections were only, so to say, pendente lite. Secondly, there had been interim orders in some of the writ petitions, that the finalisation of the list was to be subject to the result of the writ petitions and that the candidates selected should be informed either before selection or immediately thereafter, that their selection was subject to the result of the writ petitions. In these circumstances, the learned Judge rejected the plea that the writ petitions should fail for non joinder of parties, (vide Para.21). Discussing the question of reliefs to which the petitioners were entitled, the learned Judge pointed out that the petitioners were asking for admissions to be made in the light of valid and properly framed rules, and remarked that the task of framing such rules is not easy, and is bound to take time, for collection of statistics and formulation of the appropriate principles. Having regard to the progress of the academic year, to the disturbance and dislocation likely to be caused in upsetting the selections already made, and to the futility of ordering a new selection under a set of rules to be formulated hereafter, so as to benefit the newly selected candidates in the course of the current academic year, the learned Judge felt that beyond declaring that the principle followed in the selection was inequitable, no practical relief could be granted to the petitioners on the facts. This was how the learned Judge concluded: