RAJAMONY Vs. MOHAMED

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These appeals are against a common order pronounced by the Additional Sub Judge, Quilon on two claim petitions preferred against the execution of the decree in O. S. No. 12 of 1963. The decree was a compromise decree. When in execution of the decree certain properties were sought to be attached, the respondents before us the claimants in the claim petitions intervened with their claim petitions claiming the property as having been transferred to them prior to the compromise decree. The claim petitions were allowed to the extent of holding that the pattom kuzhikanam rights of the two claimants in the property were immune from attachment in execution, but that the rest of the right in the properties could be proceeded against. These orders passed on the earlier occasion by the court by orders dated 29-5-1973 were sought to be reviewed; and the review was allowed and the orders now appealed against were passed. The review was claimed on the footing that being a compromise decree the effect in law was, as if there was only a contract or agreement of the parties to which had been added the imprimatur or the command of the court, and that in the absence of any provision in the agreement for execution against the properties, no execution was leviable at all against the properties in respect of which the claims were preferred. It was claimed that the decision in Pulevarthi Venkata Subba Rao's case ( AIR 1967 SC 591 ) and Habib Mian's case (AIR 1961 All. 296) supported this proposition; and that, these decisions were by oversight not cited, before the court when the earlier orders granting only a partial immunity from execution to the limited extent of the claimant's right, was granted by the court. The said contention was accepted by the Court and the review prayed for was allowed.

(2.) We are unable to agree with the learned Judge. The decisions do not recognise anything more than the well settled principle that a compromise decree merely embodies the agreement of parties with the imprimatur of the court super added for its efficacy. But to deduce from this that a compromise decree is not executable by the ordinary processes known to, or sanctioned by, the Civil Procedure Code, just as any other form of decree, seems to be opposed alike to logic and to law. Even on the merits, therefore the review should not have been granted; as, assuming that there were grounds for review, there was no ground to hold that being a compromise decree, execution cannot be had against the properties unless expressly provided in the compromise.

(3.) That apart, we are also of the opinion that the learned Judge was wrong in entertaining the applications for review. Under O.47, R.1 of the CPC. an application for review would lie only on stated and specific grounds viz., a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, discovery of a new and important matter which could not have been produced despite due diligence, at the original hearing, or for "any other sufficient reason". These last expressions have to be understood ejusdem generis with the words preceding (vide Board of Revenue & Another v. P. K Syed Akhar Sahib ( 1973 KLT 497 ). In the Division Bench ruling just referred to, this Court recognised that subsequent judicial decisions taking a view of the law contrary to what was taken in the judgment or order sought to be reviewed would not be "other sufficient reason" within the meaning of O.47, R.1. In arriving at that conclusion this Court referred to Mulla's CPC., 13th Edn. page 1670 and at page 1672. The learned Author observes at page 1672 that a mere error of law is not a ground for review under this rule, and that it is no ground for review that the judgment proceeds on an incorrect exposition of law, or of a ruling which had subsequently been modified or reversed, or that the law is laid down differently in a later decision. The grounds thus enumerated as insufficient for review are clear enough to exclude review on the ground that a certain position of law had not been noticed or brought to the court's attention at the time of the earlier decision sought to be reviewed.