LAKSHMANAN Vs. ARIYAYI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Revision Petition has been referred to a Full Bench to consider the correctness of the ruling of a Division Bench of this Court in Kumaran v. Prabhakaran Pillai ( 1977 KLT 53 ). The matter arises out of an application for purchase of the kudikidappu under S.80-B of the Land Reforms Act. The respondent to that application, whom we may call the 'landlord' is the revision petitioner before us. The application. (O.A. 290 of 1971) was filed on 19-10-1971 by one Malothparambil Ariyayi before the Land Tribunal, Chelannur. In the relevant column the right on which she claimed was described as: right of succession ]n³XpSÀ¨mhImiw. This has given rise to a contention on behalf of the revision petitioner that the claim of the applicant was as heir of her mother, Mangot Vayalil Ariyayi, who died only on 9-1-1976, and that an application as heir, on succession to the mother, was not maintainable, when made. The mother was in possession of the properties in question with the permission of the landlord. She had obtained an assignment from the District Welfare Officer, Calicut, on 16-7-1969, of an extent of land, which the revision petitioner claimed to be of an extent of 10 1/2 cents, and which, the Land Tribunal and the appellate authority concurred in finding to be only ten cents. They have further found that the 10 cents of land so assigned to the applicants mother was fit for putting up a homestead. On these facts, the Land Tribunal and the appellate authority allowed the application for purchase, overruling the only; objection which seems to have raised before them, that the applicant was disqualified by reason of possession of land in excess of the limit indicated by S.2(25) of the Land Reforms Act. In addition to this objection it was urged before us that the application itself was not maintainable as heir of the applicant's mother, as the mother herself was alive on the date of the application. This latter ground of objection was not raised either before the Land Tribunal, or before the appellate authority and it is manifestly unjust to allow the revision petitioner to raise this objection for the first time at this stage. We are also satisfied that the same should not come within the scope of the limited grounds of challenge available to the revision petitioner under S.103 of the Land Reforms Act. On these grounds, we overrule this objection.

(2.) That leaves us with the next ground of objection that the applicant was in possession of lands in excess of the statutory limit fixed by S.2(25) of the Land Reforms Act. That clause defines "kudikidappukaran". The definition in so far as it is material reads:

(3.) We are unable to agree with the interpretation placed by the Division Bench on the provisions of S.2(25) of the Land Reforms Act. We may point out that the first proviso to S.75(1) of the Act saves a kudikidappukaran from eviction only if the land over which he has ownership and possession is "not more than" 10 cents in a Panchayat area or township". This apart, we do not think we would be justified in attempting to divine the legislative intent by ignoring the clear language of the statutory provision. We are unable to read the words in S.2(25) which speaks of land exceeding in extent. ....... ten cents" as amounting, in effect and in substance, if not in fact, to either ten cents, or not less than ten cents. We are quite unable to agree with the principle of interpretation adopted by the Division Bench, of construing S.2(25) in the light of the legislative policy discernible from other sections. We would gather the legislative policy from the clear and expressed language of the statutory provision; and cannot allow the clear language to be controlled by considerations of legislative policy. We are therefore of the opinion that the decision in 1977 KLT 53 cannot be taken as laying down correct law on this aspect. We hold that the disqualification to the status of a kudikidappukaran would be attracted only if it is shown that the person concerned is in possession of land exceeding ten cents, on which he could erect a homestead. The said disqualification is not satisfied in the instant case. We see no ground to interfere in revision with the finding of the Land Tribunal and the appellate authority to that effect.