CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY Vs. VENKITRAMAN P E

JUDGEMENT

(1.) AT the instance of the revenue, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, has referred the following questions for our opinion under Section 64(1) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953:

(2.) THE deceased, Easwara Iyer, was a member of an undivided Hindu family consisting of himself and his three sons, each having a one-fourth share in the joint family properties. On his death, the said one-fourth share passed, for the purpose of the Estate Duty Act. He had also individual properties in addition to his share in the joint family properties. THE assessment to estate duty was completed on 31st May, 1967. THE accountable person, viz., one of his sons, had paid Rs. 5,151*25 as court-fee for obtaining succession certificate in respect of the estate of the deceased. At the time of completing the assessment no deduction was allowed in respect of the court-fee paid. By an order of rectification dated July 28, 1967, under Section 61 of the Act, the Assistant Controller deducted the amount of court-fee paid by the accountable person from the value of the estate for the purpose of estate duty. Later on, however, the Assistant Controller seems to have had second thoughts as to whether the accountable person is entitled to credit for the entire amount of court-fee paid, or only to that part of it in proportion to the one-fourth share which alone passes on death. THErefore, another order of rectification under Section 61 of the Act was passed on March 11, 1970, giving credit only to a proportionate court-fee of Rs. 1,600. This resulted in an enhancement of estate duty payable in respect of the property passing on death. THE assessee carried the matter in appeal to the Appellate Controller. Objection was taken to the maintainability of the appeal which was overruled. On the merits, the Appellate Controller agreed with the assessee and held that he was entitled to deduction of the entire court-fee. He was further of the view that there was no mistake apparent on the face of the record which would justify a rectification by the Assistant Controller. THEre was a further appeal to the Tribunal at the instance of the Assistant Controller; THE Tribunal sustained the order of the Appellate Controller on the maintainability of the appeal. But, on the merits, the Tribunal also agreed that the question as to whether the entire court-fee was deductible or only a proportionate part thereof, was not a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and would not, therefore, attract a rectification order under Section 61 of the Act. This was how the Tribunal summarised its conclusion:

(3.) IT was contended for the revenue that there was neither any determination of the estate duty payable under Section 58 or Section 59, nor any assessment to penalty, nor any objection to valuation to attract Clause (a) of Section 62(1). While this may be so, we are of the opinion that the appeal is squarely covered by Clause (b) of Section 62(1) of the Act. The said clause is widely worded and if as a result of the rectification order passed, the accountable person was denying his liability to the estate duty which he was called upon to pay, that is sufficient to attract the right of appeal conferred by Section 62(1)(b). The view taken by the Appellate Controller and by the Appellate Tribunal on the maintainability of the appeal was, therefore, correct.