LAWS(KER)-1978-9-20

FIBRE FOAM PRIVATE LIMITED Vs. K KANNAN NAIR

Decided On September 20, 1978
Fibre Foam Private Limited Appellant
V/S
K Kannan Nair Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Respondents 1 and 2 in this case were employees of the petitioner, which is a firm. The petitioner issued Exts. P2 and P3 dated 13-11-74 retiring respondents 1 and 2 from service on the ground that they have exceeded the age of 58 years. Respondents 1 and. 2 received gratuity and other retirement benefits. Later on respondents 1 and 2 filed two petitions before the 3rd respondent, which is the Labour Court, Kozhikode as C.P. No. 2 of 1976 and C.P. No. 3 1976 under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (shortly the Act). The petitioner, which was the respondent in those cases, contended that the 3rd respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the two petitions and that since the two petitioners therein were retired on attaining the age of superannuation the questions of retrenchment and payment of compensation did not arise. Those contentions were turned down and the 3rd respondent passed Ext. P1 order. In C.P. No. 2 of 1976 the respondent therein was directed to pay Rs. 1,834.50 as retrenchment compensation and in C.P. No. 3 of 1976 the compensation determined was Rs. 2,374.95. The petitioner challenges Ext. P3 award.

(2.) The first contention urged by the petitioner before me is that respondents 1 and 2 are precluded from contending that they were not sent out on attainment of the age of superannuation and that the termination of their services constituted retrenchment within the meaning of the Act. It is not disputed before me that the contract of employment did not specify that the concerned workmen have to retire on attaining 58 years. The contention of the petitioner is, therefore, founded on the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (briefly Act 39 of 1972). It is undisputed that respondents 1 and 2 received gratuity from the petitioner-employer. Payment of gratuity is governed by Section 4 of Act 39 of 1972. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 which alone is relevant for the purpose of this case may be read:

(3.) The alternative argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner-firm is that the 3rd respondent had no jurisdiction to adjudge the compensation payable to respondents 1 and 2 by the petitioner. The two petitions which led to Ext. P1 order were laid under Section 33C(2) of Act 39 of 1972. That provision may be read: