GANGADHARAN PILLAI Vs. CHIDAMBARA IYER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner is the tenant-respondent in B. R. C. O. P. No. 36 of 1977 on the file of the Principal Munsiff, Trivandrum . THE respondent herein filed B. R. C. O. P. No. 36 of 1977 before the Rent Control Court, (Munsiff), Trivandrum for eviction of the revision petitioner under S. 11 (2) and 11 (3) of the Kerala buildings, (Lease and Rent Control) Act. THE respondent purchased the building some time prior to the above petition. THE revision petitioner was a tenant of a room in the upstair portion of the building at the time of the purchase. THE respondent contended that he required the above portion for his own occupation for purposes of his income-tax practice and also for the use of his family. THEre was also a case of arrears of rent. THE tenant opposed the petition on the ground that the portion of the building already in occupation of the landlord was sufficient for his use and for the use of his family. He also contended that he was carrying on his business in the building and that it was from the income derived from his business that he was maintaining himself. THE respondent let in evidence in proof of his bonafide need. A commission was also taken for reporting about the facilities available in the building. THE respondent also adduced evidence to the effect that there were other vacant buildings which might be available to the petitioner for the purpose of his business. THE tenant also adduced evidence. THEreafter, the case was posted for final hearing on 4-6-1977. THE counsel for the revision petitioner then made an endorsement on the back of the petition that the petitioner was willing to surrender the building within six months. THE offer was accepted by the respondent. THE Rent Control Court held that the ground alleged in the petition stood proved and accepting the compromise, directed surrender of the building within a period of six months. THE petitioner took the matter in appeal before the Sub Judge. Before the Sub Judge, it was contended that the order passed by the Rent Control Court was in contravention of the provisions of S. 11 of the kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. THE contention put forward was that before an order of eviction could be passed, the Rent Control Court must satisfy itself that the grounds for eviction contemplated in S. 11 of the Act existed. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Kaushalya devi v. K. L. Bansal (AIR. 1970 SC. 838) and Ferozi Lal v. Man Mal (AIR. 1970 sc. 794 ). THE Appellate authority held that the ratio of those decisions had no application to the case before him and confirmed the order for eviction. THE above order was concurred to by the District Judge in revision. THE present revision petition is filed challenging the correctness of the orders passed by the authorities below.

(2.) THE contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner is that when the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act laid down conditions under which a tenant of a building could be evicted by a landlord, it is not open to the Rent Control Court to order eviction otherwise than as provided in the Act. In other words, an order for eviction in contravention of the provisions of the Act is null and void. THE learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decisions referred to in the order of the Appellate authority in support of the above position.

(3.) IN Nai Babu v. Lala Ramnarayan (AIR. 1978 SC. 22) a suit was filed by the appellant for eviction of the respondent. The tenant resisted the claim. After the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the tenant examined two witnesses, when the case stood adjourned for further evidence. A joint compromise petition was filed by the parties which was accepted by the court and a decree for eviction was passed executable after five years. When execution was sought, the judgment debtor contended that the decree was a nullity. The Supreme Court observed: "it is well-settled that where the Rent Control and restrictions Act are in operation, a landlord cannot obtain eviction of the tenant unless he can satisfy the requirements of the provisions in those Acts. The general law of landlord and tenant to that extent will give way to the special Act in that behalf. It is also well-settled that if the court does not find the permissible grounds for eviction disclosed in the pleadings and other materials on the record, no consent or compromise will give jurisdiction to the court to pass a valid decree of eviction. " The Court then proceeded to look into the nature of the suit and then stated: "the Court is to be satisfied whether a statutory ground for eviction has been pleaded which the tenant has admitted by the compromise. Thus dispensing with further proof, on account of the compromise, the court is to be satisfied about compliance with the statutory requirement on the totality of facts of a particular case bearing in mind the entire circumstances from the stage of pleadings upto the stage when the compromise is effected. When a compromise decree is challenged as a nullity in the course of its execution the executing court can examine relevant materials to find out whether statutory grounds for eviction existed in law. If the pleadings and other materials on the record make out a prima facie case about the existence of statutory grounds for eviction a compromise decree cannot be held to be invalid and the executing court will have to give effect to it. "