RAJAMONY Vs. MOHAMMED ROWTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE appeals are against a common order pronounced by the Additional Sub Judge, Quilon on two claim petitions preferred against the execution of the decree in O.S. No. 12 of 1963. The decree was a compromise decree. When in execution of the decree certain properties were sought to be attached, the Respondents before us - - the claimants in the claim petitions - - intervened with their claim petitions claiming the property as having been transferred to them prior to the compromise decree. The claim petitions were allowed to the extent of holding that the pattom kuzhikanam rights of the two claimants in the property were immune from attachment in execution, but that the rest of the right in the properties could be proceeded against. These orders passed on the earlier occasion by the court by orders dated 29th May 1973 were sought to be reviewed; and the review was allowed and the orders now appealed against were passed. The review was claimed on the footing that being a compromise decree the effect in law was, as if there was only a contract or agreement of the parties to which had been added the imprimature or the command of the court, and that in the absence of any provision in the agreement for execution against the properties, no execution was leviable at all against the properties in respect of which the claims were preferred. It was claimed that the decision in Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao's case : A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 591 and Habib Mian's case : A.I.R. 1969 All 296 supported this proposition; and that these decisions were by over sight not cited before the court when the earlier orders granting only a partial immunity from execution to the limited extent of the claimant's right, was granted by the court. The said contention was accepted by the Court and the review prayed for was allowed.

(2.) WE are unable to agree with the learned Judge. The decisions do not recognise anything more than the well -settled principle that a compromise decree merely embodies the agreement of parties with the imprimature of the court superadded for its efficacy. But to deduce from this that a compromise decree is not executable in the ordinary processes known to, or sanctioned by, the Code of Civil Procedure, just as any other form of decree seems to be opposed alike to logic and to law. Even on the merits, therefore the review should not have been granted; as, assuming that there were grounds for review, there was no ground to hold that being a compromise decree, execution cannot be had against the properties unless expressly provided in the compromise.

(3.) THE learned Judge was therefore wrong in having allowed these applications. There was no mistake of law, nor "other sufficient cause" for review. Even if there was any such, nothing has been made out to show that the view taken originally was wrong. We allow these appeals and set aside the orders of the learned Judge and direct that the applications for review would stand dismissed. We make no order as to costs.