JOSEPH THOMAS Vs. TALUK LAND BOARD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE first petitioner was holding 34. 50 acres of land as a lessee from the Vaikom Vadayar Brahmana Samooham. On 30121969, he gifted it to petitioners 3 to 6. In ceiling proceedings against the Ist petitioner, the Taluk Land Board treated the gifts as invalid, and included the said extent of land in the declarant's account. His case that the lands are exempted from ceiling provisions, under S. 81 (I) (t), was rejected. In this revision petition against the Board's order, the question of exemption alone is raised.

(2.) S. 81 (1) exempts certain classes of lands from the ceiling provisions of Chapter III of the Act. Lands owned or held by the government, lands comprised in mills, factories etc. , house sites, commercial sites, building sites, private forests, plantations, lands occupied by educational institutions and lands granted to defence personnel are all included in the exemption. The exemption in clause (t) with which we are concerned, is in the following terms: "81 (1 ). The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to: (t) lands owned or held by (i) a University established by law; or (ii) a religious, charitable or educational institution of a public nature; or (iii) a public trust (which expression shall include a wakf): Provided that (i) the entire income of such lands is appropriated for the University, institution or trust concerned; and (ii) where the University institution or trust comes to hold the said lands after the commencement of this Act, the Government have certified previously that such lands are bonafide required for the purposes of the University, institution or trust, as the case may be. " It is said that the Brahmana Samooham is a religious or charitable institution of a public nature. The owner of the land is (was) this institution and the rent paid by the petitioners is (was) being appropriated for it. The argument is that clause (t) covers both ownership and holding in the alternative, with the result that the lands in question, admittedly belonging to the institution, should stand outside the fold of the ceiling provisions, even if they are in the possession and enjoyment of another who cannot claim the status of a religious or charitable institution. What is exempted is the land; a religious or charitable institution may be its owner, or it may have only a tenancy right over it. In either case, (and even where the institution is the owner, but possession is with a lessee) it is to be exempted. Reference was made to the definition clauses in S. 2 (40) and 2 (59 ). If these are treated as the dictionary for construing the words in clause (t), all that is required to claim exemption is to show that the proprietor of the land is an institution of the character referred to. This was shown and it was undisputed. The exemption should therefore have been granted. So goes the argument.

(3.) THUS, the integrated scheme in Chapter III rests on the computation of the extent of land a person is entitled to retain; and the exemptions in S. 81 (1) have to be construed in this context, and this context alone. If the various clauses in S. 81 (I) are examined in this background, a broad classification emerges: the exemptions are either based on the character of the land itself, or the character of the person who should be permitted to retain it. Private forests, plantations, sites of building and house sites are exempted because the legislature thought that these classes of lands should not be affected by the ceiling provisions, irrespective of the question as to who holds them. Similarly, lands owned or held by Government, lands under the management of court of wards, lands purchased by the Land Mortgage Bank and the financial Corporation, lands belonging to or held by industrial or commercial undertakings, and lands occupied by educational institutions are instances where the exemptions are geared to the nature or character of the persons holding them. In other words, certain kinds of lands are to be kept out of the ceiling limits without an enquiry as to who holds them or for what purpose; while lands of all kinds are to be exempted if they are held by certain persons, and for certain purposes. It appears to me that clause (t) falls into this latter group; and though its language may indicate that the exemption is for the land, it is really for the university, institution or trust mentioned therein. Clause (t) can be invoked only by them, in ceiling proceedings relating to them, when the question arises what extent of land they should be permitted to hold. A person other than a university, institution or trust cannot claim exemption under this clause from the operation of S. 83, on the ground that the land held by him is owned by the former.