(1.) The petitioner is one among the legal representatives of the tenant in a proceeding under the Kerala Buildings (Lease And Rent Control) Act The proceeding was initiated by the 1st respondent alleging grounds under S.11(2) and 11(3) of the said Act. The tenanted building is owned by respondent Nos. 1 to 3. It was originally owned by respondents 1 and 2 and one Lubabath, who later transferred it to the 2nd respondent and the 2nd respondent later on transferred it to the 3rd respondent. Ext. P1 is the lease deed. It is an admitted case that "the 1st respondent was authorised to receive rent from the tenant" as averred in Para.3 of the original petition. As per the definition of the 'landlord' as contained in S.2(3) of the said Act, landlord includes a person who is receiving or entitled to receive the rent. S.11(2) enables the 'landlord' to apply to the Rent Control Court to evict the tenant on the specified grounds. Therefore, the 1st respondent, who is a statutory landlord applied to the Rent Control Court for eviction on the ground mentioned above. That was allowed as per Ext. P2. The tenant challenged the order of the Rent Controller in an appeal. During its pendency, the tenant died and the legal representatives of the tenant including the petitioner herein got themselves impleaded in the appeal. But, the appeal later failed. The revision preferred by the tenants was allowed holding that the rent control petition was not maintainable in so far as the two landladies other than the 1st respondent were not parties to the rent control petition. The 1st respondent challenged the revisional order in OP. 6292/87. This Court allowed the original petition setting aside the revisional order, as per Ext. P4 judgment, holding that one of the coowners could have maintained a petition for eviction of a tenant, under the said Act. A Special Leave Petition filed before the Supreme Court also was dismissed.
(2.) As thus, the eviction order became final, the 1st respondent moved E.P. 113/91 before the Munsiff Court, Kollam seeking order to put her the building in possession, executing the order of the rent controller. The petitioner filed LA. 3976/92 in RCP 65/80 seeking to vacate the order of eviction passed under S.11(2)(b) on the ground that arrears of rent had already been paid. He also filed EA 260/91 in the execution petition seeking to pass an order holding that Ext. P2 order of eviction is not executable as subsequent to Ext. P4 judgment of this Court confirming eviction order, "respondent Nos. 2 and 3 leased out their respective portions of the premises to the petitioner after obtaining possession of the same from the other legal representatives of the tenant". Thus, the petitioner contended that there was a fresh lease in his favour by respondents 2 and 3, two among the coowners and therefore, Ext. P2 order is not executable. He also contended that by reason of that subsequent act "the purpose for which eviction was sought for under S.11(3) of the Act has become redundant and as such eviction order under S.11(3) of the Act is also not executable." EP No. 113/91 and EA 260/91 were disposed of by Ext. P14 common order. It was held that as the arrears of rent was not deposited within 30 days from the date of Ext. P13 order of eviction, the eviction ordered under S.1 l(2)(b) was still subsisting. Delivery of the entire building was also ordered in Ext. P14. Thereupon, the petitioner filed RCRP 1/96. That also was dismissed as per Ext P15. It is in the above circumstances, the petitioner has approached this court challenging Exts. P14 & P15.
(3.) The petitioner contends that the 1st respondent was only acting as an agent of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in obtaining the order for eviction, and she can execute the eviction order only if she is authorised to do so by respondent Nos. 2 and 3. It is further submitted that as there is a fresh lease by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in favour of the petitioner subsequent to the order of eviction, it amounted to an implied revocation of the authority given to the 1st respondent and therefore, delivery ordered is illegal. It is also contended that the tenanted premises was the subject matter of the new lease and when the lessee accepts the new lease, it ipso facto terminates the old lease, and in such circumstances the 1st respondent is not entitled to get the delivery of the entire premises. It is also contended that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 or the predecessor in interest of the 3rd respondent were not parties to the eviction proceedings and therefore, eviction order passed without their juncture cannot affect the rights of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the matter of letting out their interest in the building.