JOHN Vs. STATE OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner was working as Headmaster at St. Mary's High School, Mankulam, Idukki which is an aided school under the Corporate Educational Agency, Diocese of Kothamangalam. His case is that he was appointed as Headmaster with effect from 15. 5. 1990. Ext. P2 is the proceedings of the first respondent, the District Educational Officer, Kattappana provisionally approving the appointment of the petitioner as Headmaster. Subsequently, the petitioner forwarded an application to the office of the first respondent for fixation of pay in the scale applicable to Headmaster with effect from 15. 5. 1990. However, by Ext. P4 the said application was returned observing that the petitioner was not eligible for H. M. 's scale on 15. 5. 1990 as per existing rules on the ground that his service as HSA had commenced only from 1. 6. 1977. Being aggrieved by Ext. P4, the petitioner filed Ext. P5 representation before the Director of Public Instruction, Trivandrum.

(2.) THIS writ petition has been filed praying to declare that R. 3 of Chap. 26 of the KER as violative of Art. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. There is a further prayer for a direction to the respondents to sanction Headmaster's scale of pay to the petitioner with effect from 15. 5. 1990.

(3.) IT is pointed out that when the service qualification for appointment as Headmaster is 12 years as provided in R. 44a of Chap. 14a, a different formula cannot be adopted while fixing the scale of pay of Headmasters as provided under R. 3 of Chap. 26. In other words, the fixation of 16 years service qualification cannot be insisted for allowing Headmasters scale of pay. Of course, it can be seen that there are two different categories of Headmasters, first category being the Headmasters having 16 years continuous service as graduate teacher and other being the Headmaster having 12 years continuous service as graduate teacher. Both these categories of Headmasters are performing the same functions and duties in the school. Because of this situation, is it possible to argue that there is violation of principle of 'equal pay for equal work' ? However it is apt to examine whether the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is an absolute principle which can be applied in all circumstances. In this context, I am being reminded of what Chinnappa Reddy, J. said in Randhir Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1982 SC 879 at 881): ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the principle of equal pay for equal work' is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be the fundamental right. But it certainly is a constitutional goal. Art. 39 (d) of the Constitution proclaims 'equal pay for equal work for both men and women' as a Directive Principle of State Policy. 'equal pay for equal work for both men and women' means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. " As far as the enforcement of this principle learned Judge further said: " Construing Art. 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Art. 39 (d), we are of the view that the principle 'equal pay for Equal work' is deductible from those Articles and maybe properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer. " In State of M. P. v. Pramod Bhartiya (AIR 1993 SC 286) the Apex Court in unequivocal terms declared: " Equal pay for equal work, it is self evident, is implicit in the doctrine of equality enshrined in Art. 14, it flows from it. Because clause (d) of Art. 39 spoke of "equal pay for equal work for both men and women" it does not cease to be a part of Art. 14. To say that the said rule having been stated as a directive principle of State Policy is not enforceable in a Court of Law is to indulge a sophistry. Part. 4 and 3 of the Constitution are not supposed to be exclusionary of each other. They are complementary to each other. The rule is as much a part of Art. 14 as it is of clause (1) of Art 16. Equality of opportunity guaranteed by Art. 16 (1) necessarily means and involves equal pay for equal work. IT means equally that it is neither a mechanical rule nor does it mean geometrical equality. The concept of reasonable classification and all other rules evolved with respect to Art. 14 and 16 (1) come into play wherever complaint of infraction of this rule falls for consideration".