NARAYANAN Vs. RATNAMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant who is the tenant of a building is the defendant in a suit for eviction on grounds other than those prescribed under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (the "Act"). At the time of institution of the suit and until long after the decree of the lower appellate court, the Act had not come into force in respect of the area in question. The suit was decreed by both the courts on the ground of efflux of time. During the pendency of the present appeal, by notification No. GO (Ms.) No. 33/87/ PW&T dated 16th March, 1987 (published in the Kerala Gazette No. 17 dated 28-4-1987) the Act was made applicable in terms of sub-s. (3) of S.1 to the area in question. This means, as from 28-4-1987, which is the date of publication, with reference to which the notification made the Act applicable, the area in question was brought under the Act. The contention of the appellant is that the decree has become invalid as it has been made otherwise than on the grounds permitted for eviction under S.11 of the Act. The respondents' counsel, however, contends that the decree is good in so for as it was made on grounds which were permissible at the time of institution of the suit, although it is no longer executable after the coming into force of the Act. Counsel on both sides rely on S.11 of the Act in support of their rival contentions.

(2.) This mean a that a decree cannot be made for eviction of a tenant after the coming into force of the Act otherwise than as permitted under the Act. The non obstante clause shows that what S.11 prohibits is not only the execution of a final decree made on grounds not permitted under the Act, but also the passing of such a decree. A decree so made and not challenged in appeal is final, but it is not executable. On the other hand, such a decree, when challenged, is not only not executable, but is liable to be set aside as invalid.

(3.) Accordingly the respondents' counsel's submission that the decree is still valid, though not executable, would be correct only where the decree has cot been challenged in appeal; but where the decree has been challenged and the appeal remains pending after the statutory prohibition came into force in the area in question, as in the present case, the decree has become incapable of being affirmed because it has become invalid. It is, therefore, not merely cot executable, but invalid: see the principle stated by the Supreme Court in S. B. K. Oil Mills v. Subhash Chandra, AIR 1961 SC 1596 ; and P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 .